

**U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA
(1992-2005)**

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
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
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
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DEDICATION

To my loving daughter LARA,

To my loving husband Dr. Bahjat Al Jawazneh

To my dearest friend and sister Mariam

To my Parents and Sisters in Algeria

To my family in Karak- Jordan

**To every one who Fights for Better Life, in All over the
World.**

I dedicate this work

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
APEC	Asian pacific economic cooperation
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
GOP	Grand Old Party
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
JNCC	Joint Nuclear Control Commission
KEDO	Korean peninsula Energy Development Organization
KPA	Korean People's Army
KWP	Korean Worker Party
LWR	Light Water Reactor
MW	Mega Watt
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NPT	Non- Proliferation Treaty
ROK	Republic Of Korea
TCOG	Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group
U.N.	United Nations
WFP	World Food Program
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction

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ABSTRACT

Abandoned by Cold War patron, economically bankrupt, politically isolated, North Korea sees the pursuit of the nuclear program and ballistic missiles as its only path to security and survival.

Any policy from the United States can have a good or bad impact on North Korea, engagement policy which was followed by Clinton administration can reduce this insecurity, but the hawk engagement kill any sense of security in North Korea.

It's very important to know that the U.S. Foreign Policy towards North Korea did not succeed to the point of understanding what North Korea wants exactly. The hypothesis of this study was: U.S. Foreign Policy towards North Korea depends on the leader party who is in the power.

This hypothesis didn't prove true, because the researcher discover after a deep reading of the two policies (Clinton administration and G.W. Bush administration) that many players have an immense impact on U.S. Foreign Policy, such as congress, president public opinion, international hemisphere, but events and facts in the world can effect the U.S. foreign policy especially towards North Korea.

Clinton administration wasn't dovish all the time because they engaged USA in the war in Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti.

Bush administration made a big mistake when they engage USA in the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, in other hand, with North Korea they stopped negotiations and treated North Korean leader as a dictator and put his country as a member of the axis of evil and rogue state.

Bush administration ignored the agreed framework which was done by Clinton administration and consider it as a beginning of the problem not the end. Both administrations didn't make any real practical steps to end the problem with North Korea. When you analyze the behavior of both administrations you would discover that there is no difference between them in dealing with North Korea.

INTRODUCTION

North Korea is the United States' longest-standing adversary. U.S.A helped to divide the Korean peninsula at the end of World War II, and then waged war against North Korea in the 1950s. It has maintained economic sanctions against Pyongyang for nearly fifty years. The Pentagon has inflated the North Korean threat in order to rationalize its desire for a missile defense system, to justify a capacity to fight two wars simultaneously, and to explain the need to maintain 37,000 troops in South Korea (and 100,000 troops in Asia overall).

Relations between the two countries worsened in the early 1990s when North Korea expanded its nuclear program and the U.S. considered bombing the suspected weapons development facilities.

In 1994, after Jimmy Carter sat down with North Korean leader Kim II Sung, the two sides eventually negotiated their way back from the brink of war. The resulting Agreed Framework required that North Korea freeze its nuclear program in exchange for shipments of heavy fuel oil from the U.S. and two light-water nuclear reactors to be built by an international consortium funded largely by Japan and South Korea. As part of this agreement, the U.S. and North Korea pledged to move toward full normalization of relations.

The Agreed Framework averted war but did not create a lasting peace. The U.S. government has continued to criticize North Korean sales of advanced missile technology to countries such as Pakistan and Iran.

In August 1998, without notification, North Korea launched a missile/satellite that passed over Japan and demonstrated its possession of three-stage rocket technology. At the same time, U.S. and South Korean intelligence agencies leaked information that an underground facility in North Korea might house a nuclear weapons program. The Clinton administration, reluctant at first to give much credence to the underground nuclear facility, eventually insisted on access to determine if North Korea had departed from the terms of the Agreed Framework (to which it had so far adhered).

North Korea, too, has a list of grievances. It has charged the United States with violating the Agreed Framework by not delivering the heavy fuel oil according to schedule and by not moving forward as planned with the light-water reactors. It has also accused the Clinton administration of backtracking on its promise to normalize relations and thus to lift economic sanctions. Finally, North Korea has criticized the U.S. military buildup in Northeast Asia.

The relationship between United States and North Korea became worst, especially when W. Bush declared that North Korea is a member in the axis of evil, and treated North Korean leader as the undisputed dictator, dangerous, unpredictable. In general North Korea is viewed as a “Rogue State” this view has driven U.S. policy.

IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

The study stems its importance from many critical points and facts:

- The time period of the study, "post Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning of Clinton administration, the democratic one, after the presence of the republic party for a long time in the power.

- The absence of the academic studies in the Arab world about the conflict between the United States and North Korea.
- This subject wasn't treated before in the University of Jordan.

STUDY OBJECTIVES

The paper tackles diverse issues;

- It studies and analyzes the behavior of Clinton administration and W. Bush administration towards North Korea
- Making comparison between the Foreign Policy of Clinton administration (democrats) and Bush administration (republicans) towards North Korea.
- To focus on different issues in the relationship between U.S. and North Korea.
- To know what will be the future of this relationship.
- The study the impact of the two administrations (Clinton and W. Bush), and their foreign policy on North Korea.

VARIABLES

Independent variable: Clinton and Bush administrations

Dependent variable: U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea

HYPOTHESIS

The U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea depends on the leading party (democrats / republicans). In other term, the leading party draws the U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea.

METHODOLOGY

The researcher will use historical, comparative methodology and the analysis of the content. The first tool permits to know the history and the development of U.S. foreign policy, and North Korea. The second tool will help to compare U.S. foreign policy under the democrats and republicans in the case of North Korea. The third one will help to analyze the content of speeches, ideas, behaviors of Clinton and Bush administrations towards North Korea.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The researcher read many books and researches in different languages (English, French) which had a direct relation with the hypothesis and the entire paper. Most of these readings are current, and belong to different schools. The researcher tried to gather a maximum of ideas and point of views to enrich the research.

The main observation was the absence of the conflict between scholars about American foreign policy development, even if they come from different countries or schools.

On the other hand, one main idea emerged with a feeling of doubt and selfish analysis (some times) when scholars and writers tried to explain and analyze U.S. leader's actions regarding foreign policy and international relationships, especially from the realist and idealist scholars.

The last observation was about the presence of many ideas which discussed and talked about the feed back of U.S. foreign policy on the domestic level in the United States of America, and the impact of this policy abroad.

Some of studies which focus on American foreign policy and North Korea are resumed in the next paragraphs.

❖ **BOOKS**

1- The New Age of American Foreign Policy, by Frederick H. Hartmann.

This book is divided into five parts, it highlights the difficulties that impede any foreign policy, and sketch the particular nature of the American approach, relating it to the background conditions under which our attitudes were formed. Then the writer focuses on how the American governmental apparatus for handling national security questions has evolved and the overall effects of the political system on strategic choices. After that, the writer analyzes the development and implementation of the foreign policy, clarifying both the sequence of events and their evolving psychological impact.

Finally, the writer gave a functional-analytical treatment of the major contemporary problems of the United States foreign policy.

2- Seeing American Foreign Policy Whole , by Brewster C. Denny

This book deals with American foreign policy in terms of its structures. The book combines chronology and functional, or institutional, description with analysis.

It discusses the main constitutional issues and the constitutionally established institutions for and contains on foreign policy. Then Reviews the main themes of American diplomatic history from the founding through America's first major appearance as a world power, in World War II.

The book assesses in intensive period of development for American foreign policy – world war II- especially the manner in which that war and its strategic-political direction influenced the institutions and substance of American foreign policy.

It Considers the post world war II period –the most intensive and seminal period for peace-time American foreign policy – when the united states made the decision to stay the course as a major world power.

This book, Recounts the creation, out of war and navy departments created in the eighteenth century, of a modern department of defense, with a joint staff and headed by a civilian secretary of defense, who became, in effect, the deputy commander in chief of the armed forces. It Considers intelligence – a subject always important to foreign policy -but in American terms until World War II of a very low priority. it emphasizes the evolution of the intelligence community, the central importance of intelligence to foreign, and some serious errors in the structure of the American intelligence establishment that have contributed to a weakening of political strategic control of foreign policy.

At the end of the book, it addresses principally the continuing search for more effective ways of putting the foreign policy act together at the summit among the principal actors- the president, the secretary of the state, and the congress.

3- A History of American Foreign Policy, By Alexander Deconde

The writer presented a coherent introduction to the history of American foreign policy; the writer was analytical without divorcing analysis from fact and historical development. He included pertinent references to political, social, and economic developments which influenced the shaping of policy. In particular, he attempted to show and explain how and why American foreign policy developed as it did and how it arrived where it is. He also analyzed the main forces and ideas that shaped that policy and the courses those forces followed.

4- American Foreign Policy. History, Politics, and Policy .by: Daniel s. Papp & loch k. Jonson & john e. Endicott

This book provides the analytical frameworks of levels of analysis, unifying concepts, and competing themes to help our analysis and improve our understanding of American foreign policy.

The writers show us, the way that American foreign policy is made, and the issues that confront the united states in its foreign policy, if they are to gain an in- depth understanding of American foreign policy.

This book has three primary foci:

- 1- The background and history of U.S. foreign policy
- 2- The politics and process of U.S. foreign policy formulation
- 3- Analysis of critical current U.S. foreign policy issues.

This book provides detail and depth sufficient for understanding, but avoids the detail that may lead to boredom.

5- North Korea, South Korea, U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis. By John Feffer

The aim of this book is to shed light on the two Koreas and their relationship to the United States. This will be a compact analysis of Korean history, U.S. foreign policy and the changing economic and military conditions in East Asia.

This book presents the case that instead of promoting Korean reconciliation and reunification, the current U.S. government is pursuing a policy of divide and conquers.

❖ RESEARCHES

1- A "Master plan" To Deal with North Korea , by Michael E. O'hani

This research focus on the new foreign policy which USA and many regional allies such as South Korea and Japan as well as China and Russia, should apply toward North Korea, to keep away the danger of nuclear crises in northeast Asia. It presents a plan to deal with the circumstances which can emerge if North Korea decide the substantial of the nuclear arsenal or to go ahead in the nuclear program to get more diplomatic recognition from the world community. This study can help me to know the different scenarios regarding the future policy between USA and North Korea.

2 - Bush Faces Challenges on the Korean Peninsula, By Karin Lee and John Feffer

When George W. Bush became the president of the United States, the countries of East Asia watched closely to see how the American security policy would change with the transition of power from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party for the first time in eight years. Bush administration faces many challenges regarding North Korea, because it took up where the Clinton administration left off, pursuing a policy based on dialogue and deterrence.

The Clinton policy was trilateral coordination of policy toward North Korea. The Bush administration has made it clear that it prefers bilateralism to multilateralism. The first victim of this new policy was the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group, which presided over the U.S. part of the Japan-South Korea-U.S. triangular approach to North Korea.

3- Bush Policy Undermines Progress on Korean Peninsula, by John Feffer

This study focuses on the relationship between W. Bush administration and North Korea. Since taking office, the bush administration changed the policy with North Korea, deliberately distanced itself from the Clinton administration's policy of engagement with North Korea.

Even when North Korea condemned the September 11th attacks, and announced that it would sign the remaining international antiterrorism conventions and wants closer relations with the United States. Washington's new hard-line approach to Pyongyang was obvious, especially when The President Bush included North Korea in an "axis of evil" with Iran and Iraq, kept North Korea on its terrorism list and maintained the accompanying economic sanctions.

In response to this new hard-line approach, North Korea not only pulled away from negotiations with the U.S. but derailed ongoing efforts to reconcile with South Korea. The Korean Peninsula has again become a dangerous place.

Relations between the U.S. and North Korea are deteriorating into a slow-motion catastrophe with unpredictable consequences for the region and the world. In the summer of 2001, when the Bush administration attempted to revive negotiations by dropping its preconditions, North Korea remained wary.

4- Coping with North Korea, By Wade I. Huntley.

This study focuses on the policy of the Bush administration toward North Korea which has been the source of the new crisis between the two countries. He named this policy "hostile neglect", which has the responsibility for acceleration of Korea's nuclear program.

The Bush administration's general neglect of U.S.-North Korea relations has also precipitated a grave U.S. strategic miscalculation. W. Bush assumed that the aggressive policy to disarm Iraq would also bolster confrontational intimidation of North Korea by implicitly signaling that, as a charter member of the "axis of evil," it could become subject to the same type of pressure.

Pyongyang clearly got the message that when the Bush team was finished with Iraq, North Korea might be next, but the Koreans also realized that they had a "window of opportunity" to prepare for any future U.S. confrontation (as well as to compel eventual U.S. negotiation).

W. Bush administration aborted for a while direct contacts for nearly two years, they characterized North Korea as an irredeemable threat to the United States interests and emphasized that preemptive strikes and other strategic policy innovations were meant to thwart exactly the kind of proliferation that the administration expected North Korea to undertake

The U.S. domestic debate about dealing with North Korea has boiled down to engagement versus confrontation for a decade. The new Bush administration convinced that Clinton's engagement of North Korea amounted to nothing.

5- Is American Foreign Policy a Threat to American Security? Muqtedar Khan

This study presents the idea that the world is becoming anti-American, and most people across the planet look upon the United States with disfavor, they also dislike President Bush, who is not the most popular leader even in America.

More and more people are less keen on cooperating with the US in foreign policy or in the war on terror. Experts are in agreement that the primary reason why people now hate America is American foreign policy. It's exclusively self-regarding outlook, its arrogant unilateralism, and its unwise and untrustworthy rhetoric.

The researcher believes that Growing anti-Americanism will not only undermine the war on terror, but its extreme manifestations in the Muslim World are attracting new and numerous recruits to the ranks of Al Qaeda and their associates.

There are two basic reasons why anti-Americanism is becoming a global culture; they are US Foreign policy and the persona of President Bush.

The researcher proposed his point view about the President Bush, and it was clear when he said that president Bush is surrounded by policy hawks that view September 11 as an opportunity to reassert the prerogatives of the American Empire through unilateral use of force. They wish to reshape the world to perpetuate America's imperial aspirations. Unfortunately for them the world is unwilling to cooperate. The harder they push the more resentment they will generate and the more difficult it will become to save the empire and its interests at minimal costs.

This study show us that because of all ideas cited above, the American foreign policy during the administration of G.W. Bush can be a real threat to the U.S. security and big dilemma among the researcher analysts.

Data collection Method

Two main sources of data collection will be used to reach the expected of the study:

1. **Primary sources:** through main references that treated the main topics of the thesis directly to get the information needed like books articles and previous studies in the same field.
2. **Secondary sources:** through using many references which treated the main topics of the thesis directly and indirectly to identify the main concept of the study.

CHAPTER ONE: OVERVIEW ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

After the independence in 1776, from the Great Britain, the United States tried to protect trade relations with Great Britain and expanding trade with other European states, it was the leading foreign policy priority of the United States. Other Americans, led by secretary of the treasury Alexander Hamilton, considered expanded trade with France not an opportunity but a danger. They believed that expanding trade with France would endanger trade with Great Britain, lead to more animosity between the United States and Great Britain, and possibly embroil the United States in European war. In addition, Hamilton argued, that the 1778 treaty with France was no longer valid because both the French and the U.S. government had changed several times.¹

President George Washington solved this dilemma by issuing in 1793 a neutrality proclamation that declared that the United States sided with neither Great Britain nor France. The neutrality proclamation did not address the question of whom Americans could trade with, but it provided a definitive answer about the U.S. position on the war between France and Great Britain. Trying to stay out of European wars while trading with both sides- an effort in essence to mix isolationism with involvement- thus became a hallmark of American foreign policy. Unfortunately, the Neutrality Proclamation did not end America's foreign policy problems. The France's minister to the United States (the equivalent of ambassador) Edmond Genet precipitated a major crisis later in 1793² when he commissioned 14 privately owned American ships to attack and capture British

¹ Claude G. Bowers's . Classic Jefferson and Hamilton : the struggle for democracy in America (Boston: Houghton –Mifflin, 1925). P 35

² Harry Ammon, the Great Genet mission (New York: Norton, 1973)

merchant ships. The American ships took at least 80 British vessels as prizes before President Washington demanded that France recall Genet.

Until the end of the nineteenth century, American foreign policy essentially followed the guidelines laid down by George Washington, which focus on keeping a little political connection with other countries. At that time war wasn't a target but a tool, it can be undertaken only in defense of the nation against any attack. They choose peace as a normal condition of the society. This was the position not only of Washington and Madison, but of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and the other men who presided over the birth of the United States. For over a century, it was adhered to and elaborated by [our] leading statesmen. It could be called neutrality, or nonintervention, or America first, or, as its modern enemies dubbed it, isolationism. The great revisionist historian Charles A. Beard called it Continental Americanism. This is how Beard defined it in *A Foreign Policy for America* published in 1940: [It is] a concentration of interest on the continental domain and on building here a civilization in many respects peculiar to American life and the potentials of the American heritage. In concrete terms, the words mean non-intervention in the controversies and wars of Europe and Asia and resistance to the intrusion of European or Asiatic powers, systems, and imperial ambitions into the western hemisphere [as threatening to our security].¹

Like Washington before him, John Adams, after he became president in 1797, could not steer the United States onto an isolationist course. On several occasions during his presidency, Adams found the United States unavoidably involved in European affairs.² Similarly, Adams often took the military strength and economic power of foreign states

¹ Ralph Raico, *American Foreign Policy — The Turning Point, 1898–1919*. February 1995. USA.

² David Mc Cullough, *John Adams*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001.)

into account as he made foreign policy decisions, making himself what later generations would call realist

During the 1700s and 1800s, the United States had little international power and generally stayed out of European conflicts and politics. The nineteenth century has been called the period of isolationism. The Monroe Doctrine of the 1823, stated that the United States would not accept foreign intervention in the Western Hemisphere and would not meddle in European affairs. The United States pursued an actively expansionist policy in the Americas and the Pacific area during the nineteenth century.¹ The presence of many principals helps to avoid going to war, at that time they thought about fighting for freedom of other people, so it became a controversy to struggle the world by force of arms.

John Quincy Adams, secretary of state to James Monroe, who is the real architect of the Monroe Doctrine, and later himself president of the United States, declared, in 1821 that the United States will not go abroad to search of monsters to destroy.²

In 1823 the Monroe Doctrine, announced that “The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power”. It declared also that the United States viewed any attempt to restore colonies or establish new ones in the New World as “dangerous” to its “peace and safety” and that the United States would not become involved in any European quarrels.³

¹ Daniel s. Papp, American Foreign Policy. History, Politics, and Policy. Pearson, 2005. USA P 15

² David Mc Cullough, “John Adams”.

³ Foreign Relations 1898. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901)

United States advised European powers to not interfere in the U.S. affairs. In return, they promised to apply the same policy regarding Europe. This contract was broken because it was viewed as much a declaration of a U.S. sphere of influence as a statement of U.S. anti-colonialism.¹

Franklin Roosevelt was technically right, when he said, that the Monroe doctrine was not so formal or clear even as “unwritten agreement”, but Walter Lippmann was also right to say that there was a tacit understanding. The myth of isolationism was wrong. The Monroe doctrine was not only “not isolationist”, it was anti isolationist. It amounted to the recognition that the American safety depended on the balance of power in Europe.²

The year 1898 was a landmark in American history; it was the year that America went to war with Spain, and in 1899, the United States was involved in its first war in Asia against the Filipinos.³

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY DURING WORLD WAR I

Walter Mead sees that the history of American foreign policy is divided into four eras based on the U.S.-Great Britain relationship and the emerging global order. The first era, lasting from 1776 to 1823, while the second one lasted from 1823 through 1914.

During the second era, the United States existed in a Britain-centered global order. Britain’s power, and therefore the world order, was secure during most of these years.

¹ Daniel s. Papp, American Foreign Policy. History, Politics, and Policy. P 27

² Walter Mead. American foreign policy and how it changed the world. Rutledge, Taylor & Francis group. New York. 2001.

³ Franck Freidel, The Splendid little war. (Boston: Little Brown, 1958)

There was no need to think about helping to prop up the system. The United States concentrated on getting the best deal for itself within the British system, while staying on guard against the danger that Britain might be tempted by its strength to crush or divide it. The third era of American foreign policy encompassed the two world wars and saw the rapid decline and fall of the British world system.¹

In 1912, Woodrow Wilson was elected president; he was a leader in the movement that advocated using the full power of government to create "real democracy" at home. But Wilson's horizons were much broader than the United States; he aimed to extend the "making the world safe for democracy," to the ends of the earth.

Beneath the surface, neutrality was more rhetoric than reality. Even before World War I, American concerns about Germany had been building. More than one American president was concerned during the early twentieth century about German designs on territory in Latin American and the Caribbean. At the same time, Anglo-American rapprochement proceeded. By 1914, the United States was more aligned with Great Britain than with Germany.²

This alignment was bolstered by American economic ties to Great Britain and its allies, especially France. In 1914, U.S. exports to Great Britain and France totaled \$754 million. By 1916, U.S. exports to the same two countries had soared to \$ 2.75 billion, much of it in munitions and other war goods. Conversely, U.S. exports to Germany during the same period decline from \$345 million to \$2 million, both because of the

¹ Walter Mead, American foreign policy and how it changed the world

² Ross Gregory, The Origins of American intervention in the First World War (New York: Norton 1971)

United States' increasingly close liaison with the allies and Great Britain's blockade of Germany and its allies.¹

American loans to Europe's warring nations followed a similar pattern. At first, the Wilson administration asked American bankers not to make loans to European belligerents, but this soon changed. Between 1914 and 1917, U.S. banks and other financial interests loaned the allies \$2.3 billion, while Germany received \$27 million.²

By 1914, Europe was an armed camp, divided into two great opposing blocks: the Triple Entente of France, Russia, and England, and the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and a less-than-reliable Italy. All the powers had vast armies and navies, equipped with the latest, most expensive weapons modern technology could produce.

In 1914, Europe slid into a war that nobody wanted. For three years, the United States avoided the First World War, but Germany's use of unrestricted submarine warfare, its refusal to honor rights of neutral countries on the high seas, and its proposal to Mexico that Mexico ally itself with Germany to regain land Mexico lost to the United States convinced president Woodrow Wilson on April 2, 1917 to ask congress to declare war on Germany. Wilson declared that Germany had unleashed “warfare against mankind” with its submarines and that Germany endangered the “very roots of human life, and declared that “the world must be made safe for democracy”³ On April 4, the senate approved Wilson’s request, and USA was in war with Germany.

American involvement in the war marked the first explicit rejection of George Washington's and Thomas Jefferson's advice — and subsequent American foreign

¹ Ibid.

² Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Vintage, 1987) pp.194,249

³ *Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace*, vol.1 (New York: Happer and Brothers, 1927), PP.6-16

policy — not to engage in disputes that were purely European in nature. World War I is also the first American war to depend primarily upon conscripts, three million of whom filled seventy-two percent of wartime Army ranks. Though not bound by entangling alliances, the United States entered the war anyway to "make the world safe for democracy."¹

Although America's direct involvement in World War I was relatively brief, it signaled "the great departure" from American precedent at home and abroad. The Progressive Era may have been a bridge to modern times, but World War I blew up the bridge and left [us] on the other side. It was the point of discontinuity and departure. Diplomatically, all previous American conflicts had involved threats to American security, even if some were misperceived or overstated. Even the Spanish-American War (1898) was ostensibly linked to violations of the Monroe Doctrine (1823) and to security-based concerns about hostile European governments operating in the Western Hemisphere and quashing fledgling republican institutions in the Americas.²

The attempt to remain disengaged from World War I, did not mean that the United States had no foreign policy between 1914 and 1917. The United States maintained an active foreign policy during these years in Mexico and Caribbean as well as Asia. However, even during these years, the United States more and more focused on the war in Europe

The U.S. military build-up was rapid. When the war ended in late 1918, 2 million US troops were in Europe, having played a major role in winning the war. Not all of the American forces were well trained or equipped. Some never fired a shot until they were

¹ Wesley Allen Riddle, World War I and the Great Departure, August 1995. USA .P 3

² Ibid. P4

in combat, some times with weapons that they borrowed from the French. Despite the problem, American soldiers in May and June 1918 played a key role in stopping an offensive that Germany hoped would win the war. A month later over a million U.S. soldiers helped spearhead an allied offensive that drove Germany to negotiations. By October 1918, U.S. troops held over 20 percent of the Allies' front line, which was advancing slowly toward Germany.¹

Wilson discussed his view of what the post war world be like. He offered the clearest statement of his view in his fourteen points speech to the congress in January 1918.

President Wilson believed have had a perfect plan to build a peaceful postwar world. called Wilsonian idealism, his plan proposed to eliminate barriers to democracy and free trade; build an open free market economic system; end secret diplomacy; pursue disarmament; allow ethnic groups to exercise national self-determination by setting up their own democratically elected government in their own country; and create a league of nations that would use collective security. That is, states acting together against any state that was aggressive, to deter conflict. World War I changed the domestic social, political, and economic environment. The administration established the Committee on Public Information (CPI), headed by progressive muckraking journalist George Creel. Because the American people were naturally averse to involvement in a European war, the CPI's purpose was to mobilize and sustain the "right" kind of public opinion — that is, the kind that would support the war. It did so by commissioning an army of 75,000 speakers to tour in support of government wartime policies. The CPI also distributed 75 million pamphlets and produced dozens of anti-German films and expositions.²

¹ Edward M. Coffman, *The War to End all Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I* (Lexington: university of Kentucky press, 1998) . P17

² Wesley Allen Riddle , *World War I and the Great Departure*.

Between 1898 and 1919, a certain idea of America was let go and another put in its place. The older idea was of a nation dedicated to the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness of the people who comprise it. Crucial to this image of America was our traditional foreign policy: its aim and limit was to keep America strong enough to prevent attacks from abroad, or, if they occurred, to fend them off, so that the people could return to their peaceful pursuits. It was a foreign policy custom-made for the American Republic.¹

The new idea of America, nurtured by McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, and brought to fruition by Woodrow Wilson, was of a nation made immensely powerful by its free institutions and dedicated to projecting its might in order to achieve freedom throughout the world. The American people would not be allowed to return to the peaceful enjoyment of their own rights until the whole world was at last free. This was the foreign policy of America as Empire, the negation of Republic. At the end of the twentieth century, it is not clear that the American people still have the power to choose between the two.²

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY DURING WORLD WAR II

Many opposed Wilson's ideas, many Americans wanted to return to isolationism, and Europeans wanted to punish Germany. As a result, the treaty of Paris that ended the war blamed Germany for the war, required it to pay reparations, and stripped it of territory, but it also included national self-determination and the League of Nations. However, with many Americans fearing that league membership would end isolationism and force

¹ Ibid .

² Ralph Raico, American Foreign Policy — The Turning Point, 1898–1919.

the United States to act when its interests were not at stake, the United States never joined the league.

When Franklin Roosevelt became president in 1933, the United States undertook new foreign policies like recognizing the Soviet Union and adopting a good neighbor policy in Latin American and the Caribbean under which the United States would respect the rights of others. Even so, most Americans saw the United States as isolationist, probably because it stayed out of the Spanish civil war, Japan's war against China and other 1930s conflicts. Then, in 1939, World War II began when Germany invaded Poland and France, and Britain declared war on Germany.¹

At that time most Americans support isolationism and neutrality because of many reasons, some of them are:² Most Americans saw economic recovery as the primary national objective. Many of Roosevelt's supporters feared that if the United States involved itself more deeply in European and Asian issues, resources would be diverted from the new deal and it would fail.

Moreover, they remained convinced that Europe and Asia were far away and should handle their own problems. Having come to Europe's rescue in World War I only 20 years earlier, most Americans saw no reason to do it again. Isolationism once again reigned over involvement, especially when it came to Europe and Asian affairs, but elsewhere as well.

Furthermore, they were convinced that Germany was partially justified in its efforts to regain land taken from it by the 1918 treaty of Paris. Some also argued that Great

¹ Samuel I. Rosenman, Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin Roosevelt, Vol.2 (New York: Macmillan, 1938-1950)

² Wayne S. Code, American Foreign Policy Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota PRESS, 1962)

Britain and France were as much to blame for World War I, as Germany, and that American involvement in World War I was a mistake not to be repeated, probably precipitated by arms makers and bankers who profited from the war.

In addition to that, Americans remembered how during World War I, the Wilson administration curtailed civil liberties to quell dissent and opposition to the war effort; they did not want that to happen again.

Finally, having substantially disarmed following World War I, the United States was unprepared to respond military to overseas aggression even had it so desired. The U.S. army was undermanned and poorly trained, and although the U.S. navy had a sizeable presence particularly in the pacific, it was not prepared for warfare.¹

The United States at first stayed out of the war, but Roosevelt soon asked congress to pass the first peacetime draft in U.S. history and began the lend-lease program in which the United States gave ships and arms to Great Britain in exchange for naval bases. He also met British Prime Minister Wilson Churchill to discuss what other help the United States could provide and to sign the Atlantic Charter, a statement of war objectives.

In 1937, Japan resumed its war against China. The United States embargoed oil and scrap-metal sales to Japan and then froze Japanese funds in U.S. banks. In turn, Japan concluded it had to invade the oil-rich East Indies, which required it to attack U.S forces in the pacific. On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. The United States was at war.

Americans threw themselves behind the war effort, providing U.S. forces and American allies immense quantities of war goods. U.S. war strategies included creating

¹ Ibid.

a grand alliance of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States; winning the war in Europe first; and achieving complete victory and unconditional surrender.¹

When the European war ended, over 40 million people had died, Europe lay in ruins, and almost every economy was at standstill. In the Pacific, the United States used an island-hopping strategy, ending the war in August 1945 by dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan.

At the end of World War II, the United States was the world's most powerful country, U.S. homeland almost untouched by war and American fighting forces spread across the world. Never before had one country projected so much power around the globe.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY DURING COLD WAR

After the World War II ended, the cold war begins. The cold war was a political-military-economic confrontation. For almost five decades, from the late 1940s until the demise of the Soviet Union, the Cold War defined the main contours of the international landscape. It was, at its core, an ideologically charged confrontation between the West, that is, the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union. Americans accepted that the stakes involved were nothing less than the preservation of our way of life.²

Both sides armed themselves with many nuclear and conventional weapons. Small wars occasionally erupted that involved one of the superpowers or its allies. Numerous

¹ J.F.C. Fuller, *The Second World War* (New York: Meredith, 1968)

² Richard N. Haass, *Defining U.S. Foreign Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World*. U.S. Department of State <http://www.state.gov>, 2002

crises that did not escalate to fighting also occurred. The Cold War began in the late 1940s and lasted until eastern European communist regimes fell in 1989. During this era, Americans saw their mission as defending democracy, promoting U.S./Western values, and preventing the spread of communism. The United States emphasized realism over idealism, involvement over isolation, and multilateralism over unilateralism.

Many scholars, discussed the reasons of the cold war, the most important of these reasons were:

1. Past U.S.-Soviet relations,
2. Different national objectives,
3. Opposed ideologies,
4. The personalities of decision makers,
5. Differing perceptions,
6. Specific post-World War II Soviet actions like the expansion of Soviet power into Eastern Europe and Soviet policies toward Iran and Turkey.¹

The Cold War had several distinct periods. The first extended from 1948 to 1961, during which time the United States under presidents Truman and Eisenhower initiated containment, declared in the Truman Doctrine that the United States would aid countries fighting for their freedom, provided Marshall Plan aid to Europe, helped from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, sent troops to south Korea to counter a north Korean invasion, declared it would retaliate against soviet aggression by using nuclear weapons, and have several confrontations with soviets over Berlin.²

¹ Seymon Brown, *The Fact of Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969)

² *Public Papers of the President Truman, 1949* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government printing office, 1964. p 114)

The second period was during the 1960s, when the United States under presidents Kennedy and Johnson again confronted the Soviet Union over Berlin, faced down the Soviets in the Cuban missile crisis, and deployed troops to Vietnam in a war that soon became a quagmire.

The next Cold War period extended from 1969 to 1977 under Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, both of whom pursued Nixon's strategy of détente with the Soviet Union, improved relations with China, and withdrawal from Vietnam.

The final Cold War period stretched from 1977 to 1989 and included the policies of détente and human rights preferred by Jimmy Carter and the renewed confrontation and containment followed by Ronald Reagan. Under Carter, the United States continued with détente even as Carter rejected Nixon's excessive realism and emphasized human rights.¹

In 1979 radical Iranian students held the American embassy staff as captives and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Carter reinitiated containment. When Reagan became president in 1981, the United States emphasized rebuilding U.S. military strength, countering Soviet adventurism in the third world, stressing the morality of U.S. policies, and striving for free trade.

Even so, Reagan's foreign policy was focused on the Soviet Union. After Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet leader in 1985, U.S.-Soviet relations improved dramatically as Gorbachev introduced reforms in Soviet domestic, foreign and military policies. Reagan and Gorbachev in 1987 agreed to eliminate intermediate nuclear forces.

¹ Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "Human Rights and the American Tradition", *Foreign Affairs: American and the World* 1978, vol. 57, pp.503-526.

Arms control also progressed, and negotiations on resolving third world conflicts moved forward.¹

By 1989, U.S.-Soviet relations and East-West relations had been transformed by changes and military policy initiated both in Washington and Moscow. It was a different world than it had been at any time since the cold war began.

When George H. W. Bush became president in 1989, the world had changed so much that the U.S. foreign policy had to be revised.

The chief change was the 1989 collapse of the Eastern Europe Communism, which ended the main cause of the Cold War, the division of Europe into East and West.

Also in 1989, crisis erupted in China, where the Tiananmen Square massacre shocked the world and Panama, which the United States invaded to overthrow Manuel Noriega.²

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the United States assembled a coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union became less stable, collapsing in 1991 and being replaced by Russia and 14 other new states. This ended the need for containment.

The USA under George H W Bush also grappled with international economic issues ranging from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a large trade deficit, and third world debt to coping with Japanese trade surpluses and facing the European community's plan for unity. Environmental issues, the drug trade, immigration, and civil war in Somalia, to which the United States deployed military forces, were also challenges.

¹ Stephan Webbe, Defense: Regan Plans Largest U.S. Defense Building since Vietnam, Christian Science Monitor (May 1, 1981): 8-9

² Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

POST COLD WAR

The United States finds itself in a world that has changed fundamentally. For more than 40 years the United States and the Soviet Union were the foremost powers and rivals in international affairs. U.S. foreign policy, U.S. domestic politics, and international relations revolved largely around this intense rivalry. Now the Soviet Union no longer exists, and the fifteen new states of the former Soviet Union are caught up in the turmoil of economic and political change. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been fewer external constraints on the projection of U.S. power abroad than at any time since the years immediately following World War II. And yet, there are no longer common understandings among Americans about what the U.S. role should be in this changing international environment.

In the second half of the twentieth century, few events changed the world; one of them was the collapse of Eastern European communism in 1989. In the wake of this collapse U.S. and European leaders were faced with the question of whether they could construct a security system for Europe that accounted for Eastern Europe's transformation and German unification. They proved equal to the task, helped by Gorbachev's acceptance of a unified Germany within NATO¹.

¹ Konrad H. Jarausch, *The Rush to German Unity* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1994). P 15

THE MAKING OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The United States Constitution divides the foreign policy powers between the President and Congress so that both share in the making of foreign policy. The executive and legislative branches each play important roles that are different but that often overlap.

The Constitution of the United States does not say anything about "foreign policy," but it does make clear who is in charge of America's official relationship with the rest of the world.¹

Article II of the Constitution says the president has the power to:

- Make treaties with other countries (with consent of the Senate),
- Appoint ambassadors to other countries (with consent of the Senate)
- And receive ambassadors from other countries

Article II also establishes the president as commander-in-chief of the military, which gives him or her lot of control over how the United States interacts with the world.

Congress controls the purse strings, so they have a lot of influence over all kinds of federal issues - including foreign policy. Most important is the oversight role played by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee.²

¹ Eugene R. Wittkopf & James M. McCormick, *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy* .Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, USA. 1999. p174

² Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of leadership from Roosevelt to Regan* (New York: Free press, 1990). P 29

The House and Senate Committees

The Senate committee has a special role to play because the Senate has to approve all treaties and all nominations to key foreign policy postings. Members, therefore, have a great deal of influence on how U.S. foreign policy is conducted and who represents the United States around the world. The House committee has less authority, but still plays an important in passing the foreign affairs budget and in investigating how that money is used. Senate and House members often travel abroad on fact-finding missions to places deemed vital to U.S. national interests. ¹

Certainly the most important authority given to Congress overall is the power to declare war. The authority is granted in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 11 of the U.S. Constitution. But there has always been a tension between this and president's constitutional role as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In 1973, Congress passed the controversial War Powers Act to clarify how the president could carry out military action while still keeping Congress in the loop. Congress, more than any other part of the federal government, is the place where special interests seek to have their issues addressed. And this creates a large lobbying and policy crafting industry, much of which is focused on foreign affairs. ²

Making foreign policy is a prolonged process involving many actors and comprising dozens of individual policies toward different countries, regions, and functional problems. The complex process of determining foreign policy makes it difficult to

¹ Eugene R. Wittkopf & James M. McCormick, the domestic sources of American foreign. P 176

² Ibid p 180

decide who should be credited with initiating or altering any particular foreign policy. The two branches constantly interact and influence each other.¹

The roles and relative influence of the two branches in making foreign policy differ from time to time according to such factors as the personalities of the President and Members of Congress and the degree of consensus on policy. Throughout American history there have been ebbs and flows of Presidential and congressional dominance in making foreign policy, variously defined by different scholars.

At a glance, the congressional powers in foreign affairs appear at least as broad as those granted to the President. The President commands the armed forces, but Congress declares war; the President makes treaties, but not without the advice and consent of the Senate; the President appoints ambassadors, but they must be confirmed by the Senate. In contrast, Congress has several specific foreign affairs powers, including the important responsibility of regulating foreign commerce. Experience has shown that cooperation between the two branches is necessary for a strong and effective U.S. foreign policy.

¹ Jeremy D. Rosner, *The New Tug of War : Congress, the Executive Branch and National Security* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie endowment for international peace, 1995)

THE SOURCES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY¹:




FIGURE 1 The Sources of American Foreign Policy

¹ Charles W. Kegly Jr, and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*, 15th ed. (New York: st martin's Press, 1996), p 15.

The figure (1), Illustrates the relationship between each of the domestic explanatory categories and American foreign policy and their interrelationships with one another. The figure posits that domestic policy influences are inputs into the decision-making process that convert policy demands into foreign policy.

Conceptualized as the output of the process that converts demands into goals and means, foreign policy is typically multifaceted, ranging from discrete behaviors linked to specific issues to recurring patterns of behavior that define the continual efforts of the united states to cope with the environment beyond its borders.¹

The foreign policy pie gets divided in the same way that domestic lobbies exert policy influence based on their political strength, their institutional position, and the priority they set on particular policy outcomes. An industry groups gets preferential treatment for its foreign trade interests in much the same way it gets favorable treatment in the tax code. An impassioned and well-financed ethnic lobby can enjoy enormous influence over particular, narrowly defined segment of American foreign policy in much the same way that single-issue lobby groups gain influence in domestic party. The squeaking wheel gets the grease, and by the time all the goodies are handed out, almost everybody gets something.²

The Societal Environment

The broadest layer is the Societal Environment. The political culture of the United States the basic needs values, beliefs and self-images widely shared by Americans about their political system-stands out as a primary societal source of American foreign policy. Minimally, those beliefs find expression in the kinds of values and political

¹ Ibid.

² Walter Mead. American foreign policy and how it changed the world.

institutions American policymakers have sought to export to other throughout much of its history.

Included is a preference for democracy, capitalism, and the values of the American liberal tradition limited government, individual liberty, due process of the law, self determination, free enterprise, inalienable (natural) rights, the equality of citizens before the law, majority rule, minority rights, federalism, and the separation of powers. With roots deeply implanted in the nation's history, elements of the political culture remain potent forces explaining what the United States does in its foreign policy.¹

On globalization issues, for instance, industry, labor, and environmental interests can be expected to respond differently, as they try to place their own stamp on U.S. responses. On fragmentation issues, disagreements are often found among ideological and ethnic groups, who try to impose the imprint of their viewpoints on policy positions. In short, domestic divisions obfuscate a clear and consistent U.S. foreign-policy to the issues that today populate the global agenda.

The American public opinion toward foreign policy reveals these divisions, much as interest group activities do.

While American policymakers and opinion leaders remain overwhelmingly internationalist in orientation. There are signs that the American public at large has wearied of the burdens of leadership.

The majority of American continues to support active U.S. involvement into the world, but nearly, they prefer a retreat from globalism and a return to the isolationist

¹ Eugene R. Wittkopf & James M. McCormick, The domestic sources of American foreign policy.

posture of the pre-cold war era. Even many internationalists would prefer to direct attention to domestic priorities rather than international ones.¹

Public opinion in any political system usually conveys legitimacy upon foreign policy decisions. However analysts agree that US public opinion has got no effective influence upon foreign policy; it merely sets broad lines for the accepted and the rejected politically. Others perceive that public opinion forms no real restriction on decision-makers as it changes with presidential declarations and with different trends in international community.²

Rarely does any issue in the US society witness the mobilization of the public opinion and hence it has got no role in influencing pertinent tendencies of foreign policy. However it has a direct role in formulating it; decision-makers put into consideration the impact of their decisions upon public opinion, which is to vote in the coming elections.

Opinion leaders, who form nearly 2% of the society, have a great role in influencing the public opinion, thanks to their great experience in foreign policy affairs and to their wide contacts. Through their positions as prominent businessmen or government officials, they communicate their opinion to the public. US public opinion has several accesses of expression, including mass media, elections, referendums and pressures groups. Statistics show that nearly 65%³ of the American population belongs to one of the pressure groups, which play an obvious role in influencing U.S. foreign policy.

¹ Andrew kohut, America's place in the world II (Washington, D.C.: The PEW ESEARCH Center for the people & the press, 1997), 15.

² Asia al Meehi, Public Opinion in U.S. Foreign Policy. Al-Seyassa AL-Dawleya 01 01 1997. N143.

³ Ibid.

These groups practice their influence directly through personal meetings with officials, polarization of votes to its members, financing election candidates. Their indirect practices include evoking the public opinion against a certain case through campaigns and demonstrations. They also hold referendums to convince decision-makers that public opinion supports them. They collide with each other to increase influence on foreign policy makers, especially that such sort of coalition usually conveys that it represents the interests of the whole population. Although they play a significant role, their political authority can never be absolutely determined. They had the some issue, which gives room for maneuvering.¹

¹ Ibid

CHAPTER TWO: OVERVIEW ON NORTH KOREA

Korea forms a peninsula that extends 1,100 km from the Asian mainland. To the west it borders the West Sea (Yellow Sea) and the Korea Bay; to the east it borders the East Sea of Korea (Sea of Japan). The peninsula ends at the Korea Strait (Tsushima Strait) and the South Sea (East China Sea) to the south. The peninsula's northern part (including North Korea) has mostly hills and mountains separated by deep, narrow valleys in the north and east, and has coastal plains prominently in the west.

In August 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union divided Korea and set up client regimes in the South and north that immediately dedicated themselves to undoing the division. Both Syngman Rhee in the South and Kim IL Sung in the north repeatedly pressured their superpower patrons to help them reunify the peninsula militarily. The United States resisted Rhee, but in early 1950, after initially restraining Kim Il Sung, Joseph Stalin agreed to support a North Korea invasion of the South. When the Korean war finally ended with 1953 armistice, some 80,000 Koreans in both sides of the 38th parallel had lost their lives, together with 115,000 Chinese and 36,400 Americans¹.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) was ruled from 1948 by Kim il-sung until his death on July 8, 1994. After the death of Kim Il Sung, his son Kim Jong-II was named General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party on October 8, 1997. In 1998, the legislature reconfirmed him as Chairman of the National Defence Commission and declared that position as the "highest office of state."²

¹ Selig S. Harrison, *Korean End Game, A strategy for reunification and U.S. disengagement*. Princeton university press, New Jersey 2003. p5.

² Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, October 2006.

From his early days as an anti-Japanese guerrilla leader in the 1930s, Kim il Sung has had an abiding faith in the power of the military for political survival. The Korean People's Army (KPA) - the collective term for the North Korean armed forces- is a contemporary expression of his faith in the military and in his capacity to endure through adversity. North Korea's government is dominated by the communist Korean Workers' Party (KWP), to which all government officials belong. Minor political parties exist, but not in opposition to KWP-rule. In practice the exact power structure of the country is somewhat unclear.¹

Nominally the Prime Minister is the head of government, but real power lies with Kim Jong II (the son of the late Kim Il Sung), the head of the Workers' Party and the military. Kim holds a string of official titles, the most important being General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea , Chairman of the National Defence Commission , and Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army . Within the country he is commonly known by the affectionate title of "Dear Leader", in contrast to Kim Il Sung, who is the "Great Leader".² North Korea's 1972 constitution was amended in late 1992 and again in 1998. The 1998 constitution states that the late Kim Il Sung is "Eternal President of the Republic," and the post of president was abolished after his death. Kim Il Sung built a formidable war machine and presided over as supreme commander has been passed on to Kim Jong il, named supreme commander in December 1991.

¹ Institute of North Korean Affairs <http://www.koreascope.org/>

² Korea Web Weekly <http://www.kimsoft.com/korea.htm>

The looming question is whether Kim Jong il can inspire the same undivided institutional, but more importantly personal, loyalty from the KPA as his father has. The question is critical, since the KPA is the only organized group that can make or break Kim Jong Il's succession.

The KPA is more than a professional institution. It is not only the guarantor of power, political instrument, and security blanket for the two Kims but plays economic and foreign policy roles as well. It can be likened to a state within the state and, more than any other institution (including possibly the party itself), is crucial to Pyongyang's self-preservation. It may not be an exaggeration to say that, in the North Korean perception, if the KPA cracks, so will the foundations of the DPRK. Probably this explains why the two Rims have taken pains to assure for themselves an iron-fisted grip on the military.¹

Under Kim Jong Il, the KPA in the short run seems likely to have a preferential claim to state resources. Some analysts say this now amounts to one-third of annual budget outlays, or as much as a quarter of Pyongyang's gross national product.

The KPA's economic role is considerable. It is called on to provide the bulk of the labor force for major state construction projects. More importantly, arms sales controlled by the KPA have accounted for an estimated \$500 million a year in recent years, or nearly a third of Pyongyang's annual export earnings.² Lately, Pyongyang's oil crunch seems to be forcing the KPA's attention to the Middle East, reportedly to seek oil in exchange for North Korean Scud missiles and other military supplies.

¹ Akira Kuni, N, Change, in North Korea: Direction in Post-1984 Developments," Kaigai Jijo [Tokyo], No.6, 1989, pp.29-30

² Kim Kyong-joon, "The Role of the Military in North Korea's Foreign Relations," Vantage Point [Seoul], April 1983, pp.10-11,

No less significant is the KPA's role as an instrument of foreign policy toward the Third World. In the 1980s, Pyongyang is known to have dispatched military advisors to 33 "nonaligned" countries, had a military training program for 18 countries and exported or granted weapons and other kinds of military aid to 35 countries.¹

North Korea previously received a flow of international food and fuel aid from the People's Republic of China and the United States in exchange for promises not to develop nuclear weapons. This aid has ceased since the North Korean regime revealed that it had been developing nuclear weapons in secret.

NORTH KOREA'S MISSILE PROGRAM.

The Soviet Union promoted the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in North Korea in the 1950s as part of its overall plan to promote "socialist economic integration in the Far East," raise its socialist ally's standard of living, and counter the U.S. Atoms for Peace initiative. In mid-decade, North Korean scientists were invited to perform theoretical work on nuclear issues at the United Institute of Nuclear Research at Dubna, outside Moscow. Over the years, North Korea scientists and technicians have also received training in China, Japan and East and West Germany.² A 1959 agreement between Moscow and Pyongyang laid the foundation for joint nuclear activities. After joint geological surveys, the Soviet Union helped the North build a nuclear complex along the Kuryong River at Yongbyon, 92 kilometers north of Pyongyang.

Key facilities at this complex included a 2 MW(t) nuclear research reactor (later expanded to 8MW(t) - the thermal research reactor [IRT]) and a radiochemical laboratory (or reprocessing plant). Moscow provided the fuel assemblies for the reactor,

¹ Ibid.

² Valeriy I. Denisov, "Nuclear Institutions and Organizations in North Korea," , James Clay Moltz and (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 21

which started up in 1965. During this period of cooperation, the Soviet Union trained over 300 North Korean nuclear specialists.¹

The Soviet Union expanded its cooperation with the DPRK on 26 December 1985, when the two sides signed an “Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation in the Construction of a Nuclear Power Plant in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” The agreement called for Moscow to cooperatively build with Pyongyang four VVER-440 type nuclear power reactors in the North. Moscow also extended an open line of credit to enable Pyongyang to finance this construction and pledged to provide the fuel assemblies for the operational lifetimes of these reactors.²

As a condition of the December 1985 nuclear agreement between the Soviet Union and North Korea, Moscow required Pyongyang to accede to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT.³ Under Article III of the NPT, each state party agrees to accept safeguards on all of its nuclear activities as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated within eighteen months with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

However, North Korea did not sign a safeguards agreement until 30 January 1992, and the Agreement did not enter into force until 10 April 1992.

North Korea's nuclear program was long viewed with serious concern by U.S. policymakers, the issue acquired greater urgency following Pyongyang's March 1993 announcement of its intent to withdraw from the NPT. The action constituted a rejection

¹ Georgiy Kaurov, “A Technical History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Relations,” James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds., op. cit., pp. 15-20.

² Ibid.

³ Michael R. Gordon, “North Korea Joins Pact to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” New York Times, 27 December 1985.

of a demand by the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it allow a "special inspection" of two suspected nuclear waste sites at its Yongbyon nuclear facility before March 31, 1993. The sites are thought to contain evidence that in 1989 North Korea removed some of the fuel rods in a small, experimental, five-megawatt (MW) reactor and reprocessed them to extract plutonium. The suspected diversion was inferred from laboratory analysis of materials collected during regular inspections of North Korea's declared nuclear facilities that began in June 1992.

North Korea not only rejected the demand for special inspections but it barred the IAEA from further routine inspections as well. It also continued to rebuff South Korean demands to implement a December 1991 bilateral denuclearization agreement, which among other things provided for negotiation of a mutual inspection regime.¹

The sense of crisis increased markedly in mid-May, 1994, when North Korea began to remove the fuel rods in its 5-MW reactor without adequate monitoring by IAEA inspectors.²

Following the disclosure of North Korea's secret uranium enrichment program, Pyongyang issued threats to end a moratorium on long-range missile testing, which it had instituted in September 1999. The last such missile test, on August 31, 1998, flew over Japanese territory. Japan also believes it is threatened by approximately 100 intermediate-range Nodong missiles, which North Korea has deployed. Parts of the missile tested on August 31, 1998, landed in waters close to Alaska.

¹ Larry A. Niksch, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program CRS Issue Brief IB91141, 1991.

² Washington Post, May 7, 1994: A20.

U.S. intelligence agencies responded with a conclusion that North Korea was close to developing a Taepo Dong-1 missile that would have the range to reach Alaska, the U.S. territory of Guam, the U.S. Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, and the Japanese island of Okinawa, home to thousands of U.S. military personnel and their dependents. Reports since 2000 cite U.S. intelligence findings that North Korea is developing a Taepo Dong-2 intercontinental missile that would be capable of striking Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. west coast with nuclear weapons. First tested in 1993, the Nodong missile has an estimated range of 600-900 miles. The upper range would cover all of Japan including Okinawa.¹

Throughout the 1990s, North Korea exported short-range Scud missiles and Scud missile technology to a number of countries in the Middle East. After 1995, it exported Nodong missiles and Nodong technology to Iran, Pakistan, and Libya. In 1998, Iran and Pakistan successfully tested medium range missiles modeled on the Nodong. North Korea reportedly shipped 50 complete Nodong missiles to Libya in 1999. The test launch of the Taepo Dong-1 missile spurred the Clinton Administration to intensify diplomacy on North Korea's missile program.²

¹ Ibid .

² Larry A. Nicksch, U.S.-Korean Relations — Issues for Congress Updated July 18, 2003

NORTH KOREA FOREIGN RELATIONS:

Pyongyang has clearly made tactical changes in its South Korea policy, reversing itself in a number of important instances including the following:

- Pyongyang unilaterally suspended the historic dialogue with South Korea in 1973, saying it was a waste of time, but in 1985 resumed the dialogue, concluding that circumstances now favored engaging the South.
- In 1979, Pyongyang rejected a South Korean-U.S. proposal for a tripartite conference as a scheme to promote "A Two-Koreas" policy, but had a change of heart in January 1984.
- In September 1981, in bitter opposition to Seoul being chosen as host city for the 1988 Summer Olympics, North Korea reportedly voted for Nagoya, Japan, calling into question its devotion to Korean nationalism, which Pyongyang claims should transcend its ideological differences with South Korea; in 1986, Pyongyang turned around to propose "co hosting" the Olympics with South Korea.¹
- In 1991, despite its years of "principled" opposition to the idea of a separate United Nations seat for North and South Korea, Pyongyang changed its mind and applied for UN membership, vowing at the same time it would continue to struggle for a "one-Korea policy."
- Pyongyang announced on March 12, 1993 that it would withdraw from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT); on June 11, it reversed itself stating that North Korea would temporarily "suspend" its withdrawal from the NPT--but without agreeing to special inspections demanded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).²

¹ Hahm Pyong Choon, "National Division and the Olympics," Choson Ilbo [Seoul], October 25, 1981.

² Andrew Mack, "North Korea: The Nuclear Card," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 31, 1990, p.24

North Korea's approach to Seoul has undergone further, more subtle shift since the early 1980s, when Pyongyang decided to place more emphasis on anti-Americanism in its propaganda activities aimed at South Koreans. The shift helped Pyongyang capitalize on rising anti-American sentiments among South Korean student activists in the wake of a bloody suppression of an urban uprising in Kwangju in May 1980.

In 1983, Pyongyang stepped up an anti-U.S. "consciousness-raising" propaganda, asserting that the United States was neither "protector" nor "partner" of the South Korean people.

In another effort to disrupt South Korea's relations with the United States, Pyongyang launched an "anti-nuclear war movement" in the early 1980s. The movement had two aims: first, to evoke fear of a nuclear holocaust that North Korea claimed was imminent due to the U.S. nuclear presence in the South and, second, to link the initiative to the Pyongyang-directed "pan-national anti-nuclear movement" for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Pyongyang hoped the anti-nuclear card would force withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons and troops from the South--and eventually undermines South Korean stability and pave the way for reunification with the South.¹

On 31 December 1991, the Republic Of Korea and North Korea, reached agreement on a Joint Declaration on a Non- Nuclear Korean Peninsula. Under this "Denuclearization Declaration," the two sides agreed "not to test, manufacture, produce, introduce, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons" and that they would "not

¹ Katsuichi Tsukamoto, "Kim Jong Il's Recklessness," *Shokun* [Tokyo], May 1993, p.188.

possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment.”¹ These pledges far exceeded the requirements of the NPT and IAEA. To implement this agreement, in March 1992 the two sides created a Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC), whose charge was to establish a joint inspection regime to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Where the two Koreas are concerned, the United States, Japan, China, and Russia all have one interest in common: a stable and nuclear-free Korean peninsula. Pyongyang's relations with each of these countries will be crucial to its overall future direction.

The future of Pyongyang's relationship with Washington depends on the outcome of several unresolved issues. The most pressing now concerns Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program, the existence of which it denies while refusing to establish the veracity of its own claim by allowing IAEA inspections. Pyongyang argues that the nuclear issue can be resolved only through direct meetings between the DPRK and the United States. The U.S. position is that Pyongyang must comply with the IAEA special inspection because of the obligations it assumed under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT).²

A second issue involves the U.S. military presence in the South. The communist North wants U.S. troops out of the South, its argument being that the Cold War is over and that the U.S. military presence is the primary source of threat to the North. However, given the triangular nature of ties among Washington, Seoul, and Pyongyang, the North's policy toward Washington is bound to affect its policy toward Seoul. This

¹ National Unification Board, *Intra-Korean Agreements* (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1992), pp. 49-50.

² Katsuichi Tsukamoto, "Kim Jong Il's Recklessness. P 190.

means that unless Pyongyang's resolve to coexist with Seoul becomes credible, its demand for U.S. withdrawal could be misconstrued in Seoul as a continuing attempt to undermine South Korea. In the short run, it can be argued that the U.S. presence can be in Pyongyang's own interest as the presence could become a potentially stabilizing force as the two Koreas strive for mutual reconciliation.¹

Russia incurred the wrath of Pyongyang in September 1990 by normalizing its relationship with South Korea. Relations have remained tense since then, despite North Korean-Russian bilateral talks in January 1993 aimed at improving the relationship and despite their interim accord that the 1961 mutual defense treaty would remain in place, until 1995, at least.²⁰ According to Moscow, two major problems are yet to be resolved: Pyongyang's failure to pay off a part of its debt to Moscow (totaling 3.3 billion of hard currency ruble, at the 1990 exchange rate): and North Korea's insistence that Russia should stay out of Pyongyang's dispute with the IAEA over the safeguards inspection issue.²

Pyongyang has remained silent about China's establishment of diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992. With its increasingly weakened economic and security ties to Russia, North Korea can ill afford to antagonize China, Pyongyang's last and perhaps only source of outside support. Despite recent unconfirmed reports of border clashes, an intense effort has been under way to cultivate China's good will and economic and military support. So far, China has sought to accommodate Kim Il Sung as far as possible within the framework of its broader domestic and foreign policy agenda. In late 1991, China reportedly promised an increase in military aid.³

¹ Ibid, PP. 191-192

² Moscow ITAR-TASS, February 5, 1993

³ Kongdan Oh, North Korea in the 1990s: Implications for Future of the U.S.-South Korea Security Alliance. A RAND Note. Santa Monica: RAND, 1992, p.20

In addition, to help the North weather its crisis of oil and foreign exchange shortages, Beijing reconsidered its decision to require that goods be paid for in hard currency. The decision was to go into effect in 1993. China also retains considerable leverage over Pyongyang's foreign affairs and has played a key role in bringing Washington and Pyongyang together for direct talks over the nuclear inspection and NPT issues.

North Korea stands to receive several billion dollars from Japan as part of Tokyo's pre-World War II compensations (For injuries to Korea during Japan's occupation from 1910 to 1945). That would have been the case if its talks for diplomatic normalization, begun in 1991, had been completed. The talks were stymied by discords, notably the nuclear safeguards inspection issue. In time, there seems to be no question about Japan becoming perhaps the most important contributor to the development or resurrection of Pyongyang's economy. That prospect remains a concern of South Korean economic planners and policymakers.

In 2003, the North Korea joined Six-Party Talks--including the U.S., R.O.K., Russia, China, and Japan- and agreed in September 2005, at the fourth round of the talks, to a Joint Statement of Principles, in which the six parties unanimously reaffirmed the goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a verifiable manner. In the Joint Statement, the North Korea committed to abandoning its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and the other five participants offered energy assistance, steps toward normalization of relations, and regional confidence-building measures. However, in November 2005, North Korea began a boycott of the Six-Party Talks, citing the "U.S. '

hostile policy" and specifically U.S. law enforcement action that had led in September to a freeze of North Korean accounts in Macau's Banco Delta Asia.¹

NORTH KOREA'S ECONOMY

North Korea's economy declined sharply in the 1990's, this was because of the end of communism in Eastern Europe, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the ensuing breakdown of trade relations with the countries of the former socialist bloc. Gross national income per capita is estimated to have fallen by about one-third between 1990 and 2002. The economy has since stabilized and shown some modest growth in recent years. But output and living standards remain far below 1990 levels². Other centrally-planned economies in similar straits opted for domestic economic reform and liberalization of trade and investment. North Korea introduced some modest wage and price reforms in 2002, and has increasingly tolerated markets and a small private sector as the state-run distribution system has deteriorated. But the regime seems determined to maintain control.

The North Korea's economic performance over the past decade has been dismal and its prospects remain uncertain. From 1992 to 1998, Pyongyang saw a decline in its gross national product, with per capita income shrinking from U.S. \$943 to U.S. \$573.³

One expert on the North Korean economy has declared that it is, "in essence, broken."⁴ Another close observer, Nicholas Eberstadt, has identified three of the country's economic problems: the high cost of the regime's total mobilization for war a rigid, centrally planned system that does not accept the concept of private property or

¹ Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, October 2006

² Ibid.

³ Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, *North Korea Through the Looking Glass* (Washington, D.C., 2000), p.42

⁴ Ibid. P 84

market mechanisms; and, consistent with its ideology, its suspicion and mistrust of commercial and scientific interaction with the outside world.

In October 2005, buffeted by an improved harvest and increased food donations from South Korea, the North Korean government banned private grain sales and announced a return to centralized food rationing. However, reports indicate this effort to reassert state control has been largely ineffective. Another factor contributing to the economy's poor performance is the disproportionately large share of GDP (thought to be about one-fourth) that North Korea devotes to its military. North Korean industry is operating at only a small fraction of capacity due to lack of fuel, spare parts, and other inputs. Agriculture is now 30% of GDP, even though agricultural output has not recovered to early 1990 levels. The infrastructure is generally poor and outdated, and the energy sector has collapsed.¹

North Korea experienced a severe famine following record floods in the summer of 1995 and continues to suffer from chronic food shortages and malnutrition. The United Nations World Food Program provided substantial emergency food assistance beginning in 1995 (2 million tons of which came from the United States), but the North Korean government suspended the WFP emergency program at the end of 2005 and has since permitted the WFP to resume operations on a greatly reduced scale. External food aid came primarily from China and South Korea in the form of grants and long-term concessional loans. South Korea also donates fertilizer and other materials, while China provides energy. South Korea suspended food and fertilizer shipments to the North in response to North Korea's missile launches in July 2006.

¹ Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, October 2006.

However, when severe floods later that month threatened to produce another humanitarian crisis, South Korea announced a one-time donation of 100,000 tons of food, matching contributions from South Korean NGOs.¹

¹ Marcus Noland, *Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas*. P 6

CHAPTER THREE

DEMOCRAT'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA

DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The **Democratic Party** is one of two major political parties in the United States, the other one being the Republican Party. The Democratic Party traces its origins to the Democratic-Republican Party founded by Thomas Jefferson in 1792, although some scholars date the party's beginnings to the late 1820s, when Democratic-Republicans Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren built a new party along with ex-Federalists.¹

Democrats believe that right to privacy is a constitutional right. Thus as a matter of privacy and gender equality, they maintain, women should be allowed access to abortion.

Democrats typically call for "affordable and quality health care," and many advocate an expansion of government funding in this area. In his 2004 platform, Kerry affirmed the pursuit of federally funded stem-cell "research under the strictest ethical guidelines, but we will not walk away from the chance to save lives and reduce human suffering." Some Democratic governors support purchasing Canadian drugs, citing lower costs and budget restrictions as a primary incentive. Recognizing that unpaid insurance bills increase costs to the service provider, who passes the cost on to health-care consumers, many Democrats advocate rapid expansion of Health Insurance Coverage ore on-duty police officers in order to help accomplish this goal.²

¹ <http://www.democrats.org/>

² Ibid.

FOREIGN POLICY UNDER DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Clinton developed his foreign policy position, and redefine America's role in the post-cold war era and the Democratic foreign policy after twelve years of republican presidents. The only hiatus had been Jimmy Carter's four years presidency that, in foreign policy, was largely remembered for the success of the Camp David peace accords, but also for a perceived weakness because the Soviets had in 1979 invaded Afghanistan on his watch and because of his unsuccessful efforts to free the American hostages in Iran. The Democratic Party was perceived as weak on defense and unwilling to use force. On the other hand, Nixon's recognition of China, Regan's increase in defense spending, tough central American anti-communist policies, and invasion of Grenada created an image of toughness, and president George H. Bush's 1989 invasion of Panama and 1991 ouster of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, together with the recent collapse of the Soviet Union, had all helped to shape the image of a successful republican foreign policy. In fact, republicans seemed invincible.¹

During the campaign, Clinton trailed president Bush 15 percent to 63 percent in perceived ability to conduct foreign policy.² Clinton sought to neutralize that deficit by taking many centrist positions, not only because he believed them appropriate but also because he hoped to win back the so called Reagan Democrats who had abandoned the Democratic Party for more than a decade. Clinton called for "the world's strongest defense, ready and willing to use force, when necessary." Recognizing the concern of conservatives that the United States not overextends its forces, he advocated the selective use of U.S. influence, saying that "America's challenge in this era is not to

¹ Nancy Soderberg, *The Superpower Myth, The Use and Misuse of American Might*. John Wiley & Sons Inc Hoboken, New Jersey, 2005. P 5

² Peter Hart and Breglio Research Cos., poll conducted April 1-14, 1992.

bear every burden, but to tip the balance.” Although he did propose modest cuts in defense spending to “plow those savings back into jobs right here at home,” Clinton modernization and increased support for soldiers and their families. He supported many of bush’s positions such as aid to the former Soviet Union, engagement in the Middle East peace process, and arms sales to Saudi Arabia. ¹

THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY: 1993 -2001

As he became president in 1993, reflecting public opinion, Bill Clinton promised to “focus like a laser beam” on domestic economic issues.

Our goal is constant: to make sure the US remains the greatest force for peace and prosperity on Earth. [Our] new strategy for the 21st century has three parts:

1. Making the American people more secure by keeping our military and alliances strong to combat the major threats to our security, like the spread of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.
2. Leading the powerful global movement for peace and democracy.
3. And creating much greater wealth at home by opening markets abroad.²

The new president soon discovered however, that foreign policy could not be ignored. He thus devised strategic concepts to replace the now irrelevant containment.

¹ Oberdorfer, Don, Washington post , September 29, 1992

² Bill Clinton. Between Hope and History. USA 1996. p.147-148

CLINTON'S STRATEGY

Even though he at first intended to concentrate on domestic affairs, Clinton was not an isolationist, declaring in the 1992 campaign that the United States should “lead a global alliance for democracy as united and steadfast as the global alliance that defeated communism.”¹ This intention to remain involved in world affairs in support of democracies crystallized during the Clinton presidency into the strategies of engagement and enlargement. Involvement as opposed to isolationism thus remained preeminent throughout the Clinton years, with a tendency to side with foreign policy idealism as opposed to realism also apparent. During his two terms as president, it also became evident that Clinton preferred multilateralism, although he was not averse to unilateral action if he believed American interests required it.

Engagement meant that the United States would not retreat into isolationism as after World War I and for a short time after World War II. With the cold war over and communism gone from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, engagement meant that U.S. policies toward these states would be based on cooperation, assistance, and negotiation rather than confrontation. Engagement was linked to enlargement, a concept under which the United States promoted democracy, open markets, and other western political, economic, and social values. As national security adviser Anthony Lake declared in 1993: “the successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of engagement-enlargement of the world’s free community. We must counter the aggression – and support the liberalization – of states hostile to democracy. The United

¹ Bill Clinton, “A strategy for foreign policy.” vital speeches of day (May 1, 1992).

States will seek to isolate [non-democratic states] diplomatically, militarily, economically, and technologically.”¹

In many respects, then, enlargement was a synonym for democratization. By pursuing enlargement of those territories of the world that were governed by democratic governments, the Clinton administration hopes to create not only a more democratic world but also a more peaceful world. According to the democratic peace theory, democracies rarely if ever went to war with other democracies.²

Thus, any increase in the number of democracies around the world decreased the chances of war and conflict. The democratic peace theory had numerous proponents within the Clinton administration.

Together, then, engagement and enlargement provided Clinton a rationale under which the United States promoted democracy around the world, assisted former communist states, intervened in third world crises, pushed for an open international economic system, and tried to counter terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As with containment, neither engagement nor enlargement defined limits to action. Thus, throughout Clinton’s two terms, critics asserted that the United States lacked strategic purpose even though it was engaged everywhere and intervened frequently.

Engagement and enlargement continued throughout Clinton’s presidency, but another concept, sustainable development did not. Sustainable development asserted that “peace, development, and environmental protection are indivisible”

¹ Anthony Lake, “from Containment to Enlargement,” Department of State Dispatch (September 27, 1993), pp, 658-664.

²Michael .E .Brown, Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: mitt press), 1997.

And that economic development must “meet the needs and aspirations of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”¹

The George.H.W.Bush administration had rejected sustainable development, along with other proposals put forward at the Rio earth summit, but Clinton intended to formulate policies in line with sustainable developments multilateral and idealistic preferences to protect the environment, control population growth.² However, the Republican Party won control of congress in the 1994 congressional elections and adopted a policy agenda that emphasized U.S. interests over international concerns, and unilateralism. As a result, sustainable development disappeared from the foreign policy agenda.

EAST ASIA POLICY UNDER THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

The U.S. security policy under president Bill Clinton was coordinated under the concept of " engagement and enlargement" in east Asia and pacific region, the essence of America's engagement policy was to keep approximately 100,000 troops in the region while maintaining the existing security alliance with Japan and south Korea. The concept of enlargement meant to expand democracy and adherence to human rights in the countries of the region.

In contrast with Eastern Europe where communist regimes have collapsed after the Cold War, the communist regimes in this region (Asia) maintained its political forms. Furthermore, the uncertainties casting shadows over security concerns to the countries

¹ United nation conference on environment and development, agenda 21 (New York: united nation 1992)

² U.S. Agency for international development, strategies for sustainable development (Washington, D.C.: U.S. department of state, 1994), p. 4.

in this region stayed intact, one with confrontation between north and South Korea, and other with china and Taiwan. China, which pursues to blend a market economy with socialist society, has indicated its willingness to participate in the international economic system and has been working toward joining the world trade organization (WTO).

Clinton declared that his security strategy in Asia has four priorities:

1. Maintaining [our] military commitments to the region.
2. Supporting stronger security cooperation among Asian nations.
3. Providing leadership to combat emerging threats.
4. Supporting emerging democracies.

[We] have worked hard with China to see that it embraces nuclear nonproliferation; agrees to abide by the rules of free and fair trade; cooperates in regional and global security initiatives; and grants basic human rights to its own citizens-in short, to see that a resurgent China takes its rightful place as a leader for positive change for its own people, and for the world. But [we] haven't been shy about voicing our differences-and acting on them. When China conducted menacing military exercises in the Taiwan Straits, [I] sent the Seventh Fleet to the area to demonstrate out commitment to ensuring peaceful relations between China and Taiwan. ¹

In the last year of the Clinton administration, the future of the Korean peninsula suddenly moved to center stage. South Korean President Kim Dae Jung was invited to visit Pyongyang, the capital of the North Korea. The second highest-ranking North Korean military officer was invited to Washington, and Secretary of the State Madeline Albright paid a return visit to Pyongyang. ²

¹ Bill Clinton, Between Hope and History. p.151-152

² Henry Kissinger. Does America need a foreign policy? p. 128

THE 1993-94 CRISIS

Clinton never made any talk about North Korea during his first presidential campaign in 1992. However, Clinton very quickly figured out he would have to deal with North Korea when fears starting to arise that they were generating materials for nuclear weapons with their small nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. Clinton, in response to these fears, decided to start military training exercises, known as Team Spirit, in South Korea. This flexing of military muscle prompted North Korea to threaten to pull out of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). After some negotiations North Korea agreed to pull back on their threat of withdrawing from the NPT. This led Clinton to reward North Korea for its reversal by not considering any trade sanction or military actions against the DPRK.¹

In February 1993, the IAEA's Board of Governors passed a resolution requesting the DPRK to permit the "full and prompt implementation" of its safeguards agreement "without delay." The North immediately rejected the request and two weeks later gave the requisite 90-days notice that it was withdrawing from the NPT, something no country had ever done. In response, the United States decided to hold direct high-level talks with North Korea to prevent it from doing so.

The two sides first met in June, where the United States won the DPRK's agreement to remain an NPT party. Thus began an on-again, off-again process of tense negotiations over the next sixteen months². The United States tried to balance its support for nonproliferation principles generally and the IAEA inspections regime specifically, its sensitivity to the priorities of its South Korean ally, and its desire that Pyongyang not increase its nuclear weapons capabilities by separating additional

¹ Henirksen, Thomas H. "Clinton's Foreign Policy in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea." Stanford: Stanford University, 1996. p 37

² Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation (New York, 1995)

plutonium. For its part, the DPRK refused to allow comprehensive IAEA inspections or to surrender the additional plutonium it had separated (enough for one or possibly two bombs, according to U.S. analysts). Tensions reached the boiling point in May 1994, when Pyongyang decided to pull the fuel rods from its 30MW reactor.

This fuel contained enough plutonium for an estimated five or six nuclear weapons. As both sides prepared for a possible war, former President Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang and brokered the makings of a deal with Kim Il sung that defused the immediate crisis by freezing activities at Yongbyon and allowing negotiations between the United States and the DPRK to resume. Within four months, the two sides reached agreement “The Agreed Framework”¹

Relations between the United States and North Korea have become tense over the alleged nuclear development program and the test launching of missiles. At the same time, the policy coordination among Japan, the United States and South Korea emerged as a result of the Perry process.

PERCEPTION OF EAST ASIA STRATEGY OF CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

President Clinton, who had criticized the Bush administration during his election campaign of their economic policy, focused his policy priority on economic and other domestic issues. Consequently, economic issues took the center stage of his foreign and security policies, decisions of which have often been influenced by domestic imperatives.²

Clinton administration view of the East Asian strategic environment had unveiled in a confirmation hearing of the senate foreign relations committee on Winston Lord nominated as assistant secretary for the Asian and pacific affairs.

¹ Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb.

² Daniel S. Papp, American foreign policy .

At the hearing Lord specifically spelled out that "today, no region in the world is more important for the united states than Asian and the pacific ". He said that the United States should adopt a policy corresponding to the rapid economic growth of the region, the rapidly increasing interchange and the rise of new generation, and secure national interest in ways conducive to the economic to the economic prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. Lord argued that to accomplish this goal, the United States must strengthen the competitiveness of its domestic industry and promote cooperation with member countries of the Asia-pacific economic cooperation (APEC).¹

In the area of security, he stressed the danger of a withdrawal of the U.S. forces from the region and the necessity to maintain its alliance arrangements and importance of maintaining multilateral security dialogue in the region.

Such perception of East Asia was presented by President Clinton when he visited Japan and South Korea in July 1993. In the speech titled "building a new pacific community ", Clinton said that Japan and the United States "shared strength, shared commitment, and shared commitment to democratic value", and defined the Japan-U.S. relationship as bilaterally the most important the Asia-pacific region. Having said that, he proposed to solve various economic issues between the two countries and build a cooperative relationship in dealing with the security problem of the Asia-pacific region. He stressed the utmost importance of the continued presence of the U.S. forces and the prevention of proliferation of mass destruction in the Asia-pacific region, and acknowledged the importance of multilateral security dialogue.²

¹ Ibid

² Henirksen, Thomas H. "Clinton's Foreign Policy in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea.

In its second term, the Clinton administration had continuously shown interest in three basic areas:

1. Enhancing America's security with effective diplomacy and with military force that is ready to fight and win,
2. Bolstering America's economic prosperity
3. Promoting democracy and human rights abroad.

In a National security Strategy of May 1997, soon after it entered the second term, and the consecutive report released in October 1998 and January 2000, the Clinton administration reaffirmed these policy objectives.¹

THE AGREED FRAMEWORK

The Agreed Framework was signed by Robert Galluci for the US and Kang Sŏk-chu for the DPRK on October 21st, 1994.

The Agreed Framework was a process by which both sides set out slowly to build a sense of trust. But both sides began hedging their bets early in that process. Since neither the US nor North Korea fulfilled many of the agreed steps even during the Clinton administration, the framework was essentially dead long before the recent nuclear revelations.²

North Korea proceeded with a nuclear program during the 1990s that most observers believed had military purposes. Greatly concerned, the communist state “froze” its nuclear program in return for the construction by the United States, Japan, and South Korea of two nuclear power plants that would not use or produce weapons-grade

¹ North Korea has a point, By David Kang Financial Times; Jan 02, 2003

² Ibid.

nuclear materials. The agreement also provides up to ten years of free oil and promoted diplomatic relations. The price of nonproliferation was high, but perhaps not as high as the price of what might occur if proliferation proceeded.¹

The essential feature of the Framework Agreement was to build two light-water nuclear reactors by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) that will be financed by the United States, Japan, and South Korea. In other hand North Korea was to abandon the development of graphite-moderator reactors (heavy-water nuclear reactors) from which plutonium can be easily extracted. Also under this agreement, North Korea was supposed to freeze its existing nuclear weapon development program and comply with an inspection by the IAEA of certain parts of its nuclear facilities

The Clinton administration helped produce the important 1994 Agreed Framework, under which North Korea effectively froze its major nuclear programs and promised effectively to undo whatever nuclear weapons progress it had earlier made at its small research reactor. At the time, the United States and allies South Korea and Japan were accused of giving in to North Korean blackmail, but the deal they signed was a smart one: energy in exchange for energy and nonproliferation.

Washington and its allies did not provide \$4 billion in cash for Pyongyang, as often claimed by critics, but instead provided the dollar equivalent of a \$4 billion value to produce energy that the Yongbyon nuclear facilities would otherwise have produced. If the deal had a flaw, it was that it left North Korea in possession of its spent fuel rods for too long, though it is not obvious that Pyongyang would have agreed to quickly surrender them. It also promised North Korea new types of nuclear reactors,

¹ Michael J. Mazarr , North Korea and the bomb.

purportedly—proliferation resistant—but not entirely free from the danger of having their spent fuel ultimately diverted to weapons purposes by the North Korean regime. But those reactors will almost certainly not be completed, so at worst the 1994 accord bought time.¹

North Korea had concluded a safeguards agreement with the **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)** in 1992, which requires North Korea to report all nuclear programs to the IAEA and gives the IAEA the right to conduct a range of inspections of North Korea's nuclear installations. However, North Korea obstructed or refused IAEA inspections in 1993-94, including refusal to allow an IAEA special inspection of an underground facility, which the IAEA believed was a nuclear waste site.²

The Agreed Framework provided for the suspension of operations and construction of North Korea's "graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities" and the storage of 8,000 nuclear fuel rods that North Korea had removed from the five megawatt reactor in May 1994. It provided to North Korea 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually until two light water nuclear reactors (LWRs) are constructed in North Korea. The United States is obligated to facilitate the heavy oil shipments and organize the construction of the LWRs.³

The IAEA monitored the freeze of the designated facilities and activities. The Agreed Framework states that before North Korea receives nuclear materials for the LWRs, it is obligated to come into full compliance with its obligations as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with regard to its past nuclear activities.

¹ Michael E. O'Hanlon, A "Master Plan" to Deal With North Korea, January 2003

² <http://www.iaea.org/>

³ Wade L. Huntley, Coping with North Korea. FPIF Policy Report February 2003

Clinton Administration officials testified that this clause will obligate North Korea to allow IAEA inspection of the suspected waste site and the stored fuel rods. They also testified that any additional North Korean nuclear programs, including any secret programs, are covered by the 1992 safeguards agreement and are subject immediately to IAEA safeguards, including inspections¹.

The United States, ROK and Japan founded The **Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)** in March 1995 and serve on its decision-making Executive Board. It was created to implement provisions of the Agreed Framework related to heavy oil shipments and construction of the light water reactors. The European Union, through its European Atomic Energy Community, joined KEDO as an Executive Board member on 17 September 1997.²

The Agreed Framework set a target date of 2003 for completion of the first of the light water reactors. KEDO officials now project the completion of the first light water reactor in 2008. From October 1995 through November 2002, North Korea has received the annual shipments of 500,000 tons of heavy oil. The cost to the United States of the heavy oil and financial support of KEDO from 1995 through 2002 is \$378 million.³

In fact, when North Korea declared in April 1996 that it would no longer honor the cease-fire agreement and then sent its troops into the demilitarized zone (DMZ), the Clinton administration showed no military response.

¹ Ibid.

² <http://www.kedo.org/>

³ Wade L. Huntley, *Coping with North Korea*

Some in the U.S. government had not predicated that North Korea would implode by around 1996, but it had not occurred as of the end of 1996, nor had the type of change the United States had hoped for occurred in the North Korean regime. Moreover, the North Korea policy, the Clinton administration came up with after the Framework Agreement had carrots but no sticks, and this gave North Korea room for engaging in diplomatic brinkmanship.

One piece of diplomatic brinkmanship by North Korea compelled the United States to review its policy - the missile test North Korea conducted in the summer of 1998. the test by North Korea shattered to pieces the assumption underlying the Framework Agreement- that the North Korea regime was on the verge of collapse and that it would find maintaining the status quo in its best interest - and brought the United States around to the view that a new comprehensive approach was necessary . In other words, the United States realized the necessity to restructure its North Korea policy on the assumption that the Kim John II will not collapse for the time being

PERRY PROCESS

In November 1994, the Republican Party captured the House of Representatives and with it both chambers of the U.S. Congress for the first time in 40 years. One plank of the Republican Party's "Contract with America" campaign platform in the House was criticism of the Clinton Administration's handling of foreign policy, with North Korea singled out for special concern. After reports emerged of an alleged secret DPRK nuclear weapons site at Kumchang-ni (where nothing was found after on-site inspection), and Pyongyang's launch of a three-stage Taepo Dong I ballistic missile in August 1998, Congress passed legislation requiring the Clinton Administration to

appoint a “North Korea Policy Coordinator” to conduct “a full and complete interagency review of United States policy towards North Korea” and “provide policy direction for negotiations with North Korea related to nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other security related issues.”¹ Former Secretary of Defence William J. Perry was selected for the role. A year later, after close consultations with Congress and American allies in East Asia, Perry presented his recommendations.

In response to Perry’s visit to Pyongyang in May 1999 and the report’s recommendations, the Clinton Administration invited the DPRK’s Vice Marshal, General Cho Myong-nok, to Washington in September 2000. This meeting resulted in a joint U.S.-DPRK statement in which each party declared it had no “hostile intent” towards the other. A second result was an invitation to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to visit Pyongyang, a trip she took a few weeks later. At these and subsequent meetings, the two sides undertook discussions to eliminate the DPRK’s long-range ballistic missile program, including exports. The DPRK wanted President Clinton to come to Pyongyang to sign the deal before his term of office ended in January 2001; U.S. officials were reluctant to send the President without all the details of a missile deal already agreed. In the end, the trip never took place².

The Perry Process, was the outcome of close consultations of Dr. William Perry, senior North Korea policy coordinator, and his team with their counterparts in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan over the renewed threat of the Taepodong-I missile test-fired over Japan on August 31, 1998.

¹ H.R. 4328, the Fiscal Year 1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act (PL 105-277), Section 582(e), 19 October 1998.

² Leon V. Sigal, “North Korea: On Hold...Again,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 57, no. 3 (May/June 2001), pp. 33-39.

The United States has held many rounds of negotiations with North Korea through a number of channels, in close policy coordination with the Republic of Korea and Japan. At the Berlin missile talks in September 1999, for example, suspension of its Taepodong-2 the U.S. and DPRK agreed to lift some economic sanctions against Pyongyang in return for Pyongyang's missile program. And, as was revealed in the Perry Report,¹ the US would make efforts for a gradual normalization of its relations with the long-hostile, rogue state of North Korea. On its part, South Korea was actively supporting various projects of cooperation and aid toward North Korea in the civilian sectors while waiting with patience a similar progress in the political sector as well. The consistent engagement policy of Seoul and Washington with North Korea resulted in active exchanges and cooperation culminating at the first North-South Korean summit in June 2000.

ASSESSMENT OF THE PERRY PROCESS

The Perry Report and Process best represented the Clinton Administration's continued effort to prevent and counter the proliferation of WMDs on the world scene. The strategy of preventive defense proved quite successful in dealing with nuclear missiles in the Republics of the former Soviet Union. Similarly, the focus of the Perry Process was to freeze missile activities of Pyongyang and pave the way to normalizing relations with North Korea. Dr. Perry undoubtedly tried to apply this proven strategy of a three-phased preventive defense to the North Korean case.² According to Dr. Perry, there were also three clear guidelines for any new strategy, which has been the case with North Korea as well.

¹ William Perry, Press Briefing on U.S. Relations with North Korea, Washington, DC, September 17, 1999. P37

² William J. Perry, "Security and Stability in the Asia-Pacific Region," Pac Net N. 19, Pacific Forum CSIS, May 12, 2000. P7

After close consultation and policy coordination with these two allies, the Perry Report recommended three approaches to normalizing relations with North Korea:

1. In the near-term, create the right environment: The DPRK should forgo its missile launches, the U.S. should ease some appropriated sanctions, and the ROK and Japan should take their own steps in the positive direction.
2. In the medium- to longer-term, receive credible and verifiable assurances that North Korea has ended its nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missile programs.
3. In the long-term, work with North Korea, the ROK and Japan to end the vestiges of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula.

Put in a nutshell, the Perry Process has been a comprehensive and integrated approach to the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile-related programs, adopting the MTCR, threat containment and coercive deterrence.¹

Overall, the Perry Process has been a great success, this because the Perry Process has obviously proven quite successful in freezing Pyongyang's missile programs. Pyongyang has thus far shown no sign of resuming missile launches and been cooperative in restraining from missile sales. And US-DPRK missiles talks have made some progress.²

Moreover the process fully reflected the intents and wishes of President Kim Dae-jung's engagement policy toward North Korea. It has actually supported Seoul's policy of consistent reconciliation and cooperation with Pyongyang. It also considered the positions of North Korea in its dialogue with the South. With the Perry Process firmly

¹ Ibid.

² Ralph Cossa, Regional Overview: Storm Clouds on the Horizon? PacNet, No. 40, October 15, 1999

in place, therefore, the North Korean leadership appeared to have chosen to improve their relations with the South in earnest. The historic summit of June 2000 and subsequent talks and meetings at various levels owe partly to the Perry Process.

Furthermore, the Perry Process has been a success in promoting active consultation and coordination among the United States, the ROK and Japan, unlike the Geneva Agreed Framework where the ROK remained arguably isolated.¹ The trilateral coordination was one of the key policy recommendations of the Perry Report. They included appointment of a senior official of ambassadorial rank to coordinate policy on the DPRK, close policy coordination through what has become known as the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), exploring with Congress ways to create an sustainable, bipartisan, long-term outlook toward the North Korean problem, and preparations for the DPRK provocation such as the launch of a long-range missile. Most analysts did not fail to point out that one of the important contributions of the Perry Process has been “to effectively strengthen alliance coordination with Japan and South Korea through the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG).”²

In addition to that, the Perry Report proved successful because it proposed two alternative tracks. The first track was the improvement of fundamental relations with the U.S., Japan and the ROK, while the second track was, if the first one fails, to fall back to containment.³ This two-track approach was needed to persuade and win the support of the Republican Congress that opposed further compensations for Pyongyang’s wrongdoings. To the hardliners who concluded North Korea’s nuclear

¹ Jongchul Park, “US-ROK-Japan Trilateral Coordination in the Implementation of the Perry Report,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XI, No. 2 (Winter 1999), pp. 97-119

² Scott Snyder, “Perry process and progress in inter-Korean relations,” Korea Herald, December 7, 1999

³ U.S. Ambassador to the ROK Hon. Stephen Bosworth’s congratulatory remarks at the Defense Analysis Seminar (DAS) X at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, Seoul, Korea, October 25, 1999.

and missile threat had actually increased over the five years since the Geneva Agreed Framework of October 1994, Pyongyang's gambling was not a right choice. Pyongyang may have some gains in the near term, but it would suffer a longer-term loss of the opportunity of a timely normalization of its relations with Washington. After all, maintaining military deterrence against North Korea has formed the basis of U.S. engagement policy toward North Korea.

And finally, the Perry Report and Process did not assume that the North Korean government would change in the near future, either collapse or reform. Rather, it recommended the U.S. should pursue normalization of relations with North Korea with special emphasis on freezing the DPRK's nuclear and missile programs. This assumption has facilitated the consistent engagement policy toward North Korea, which in turn has promoted reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas. Any big changes in the North including a sudden collapse or reform are hard to expect in the near future. Many analysts share the view that normalizing relations with the North will probably be a long, protracted process that requires considerable amount of time and patience.

FOOD AID

Agriculture production in North Korea began to decline in the mid-1980s. Severe food shortages appeared in 1990-1991. In September 1995, North Korea appealed for international food assistance. From 1996 through 2001, the United States contributed about 1.8 million tons of food aid to North Korea through the United Nations World Food Program.¹

¹ Korea Central News Agency <http://www.kcna.co.jp/>

During a famine in the mid-1990s, an estimated 1-2 million North Koreans perished, or roughly 5-10 percent of the North's population. Pyongyang first officially appealed for international humanitarian assistance in 1995 and has received food aid ever since. The UN Food and Agricultural Organization, the World Food Program (WFP), and UNICEF have been among the leading donors. Since 1995, the United States has provided U.S. \$615 million in food assistance to the DPRK, primarily channeled through the WFP. The DPRK has not allowed international relief organizations to conduct a national nutritional survey, unrestricted access to all parts of the country, or monitor the distribution of food aid - all standard practices in other countries. Pyongyang's obstruction has caused a number of food donors, such as Medicines Sans Frontiers, Action against Hunger and CARE, to withdraw their services.¹

The Clinton administration's aid to North Korea was designed to persuade Kim Jong II to abandon his ballistic missile program and reduce his threatening (threats are a standard negotiating tactic for North Korea).²

The Clinton Administration used food aid to secure North Korean agreement to certain types of negotiations and North Korean agreement to allow a U.S. inspection of the suspected nuclear site at Kumchangri.

Critics have pointed to two other issues:

- The weaknesses in monitoring food aid distribution in North Korea and the absence of North Korean economic reforms, especially agricultural reforms.
- The U.N. World Food Program requested donations of 611,000 tons of food for North

¹ Mark E. Manyin, U.S. Assistance to North Korea, CRS Report to Congress, 17 March 2003.

² Doug Stuck, North Korea warns it may test missiles," Washington post foreign service, 22 Feb 2001, p.18

Korea in 2002, but it received only 430,000 tons.¹

It acknowledges that the North Korea places restrictions on its monitors' access to the food distribution system, but it believes that most of its food aid reaches needy people. Several private aid groups, however, withdrew from North Korea because of such restrictions and suspicions that the North Korean regime was diverting food aid to the military or the communist elite living mainly in the capital of Pyongyang.

It is generally agreed that the regime gives priority to these two groups in its overall food distribution policy. Some experts also believe that North Korean officials divert some food aid for sale on the extensive black market.

The regime, also, refuses to adopt agricultural reforms similar to those of fellow communist countries, China and Vietnam, including dismantling of Stalinist collective farms. While such reforms resulted in big increases in food production in China and Vietnam, North Korea continues to experience sizeable food shortages year after year with no end in sight. It is estimated that one to three million North Koreans died of malnutrition between 1995 and 2002.²

¹ Doug Stuck, North Korea warns it may test missiles,"

² Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR

REPUBLICAN'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA

Republican Party:

The Republican Party is known as the GOP. According to the Oxford English Dictionary the first known reference to the Republican Party as the "grand old party" came in 1876. The first use of the abbreviation G.O.P. is dated 1884, the symbol of this party is the elephant.

Since the 1960s the Republican Party has been increasingly dominated by conservative politics. In broad terms, Republicans believe the private sector and/or the individual are better suited than the government to control their own lives¹.

Major policies that the party has recently supported include a neoconservative foreign policy, including the War on Terror, invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and strong support for democracy, especially in the Middle East. The party has been criticized as being too globalistic.

The Republican Party has demanded reforms in the UN and opposes the Kyoto Protocol due to protocol's uneven application to countries around the world, because it is likely to slow economic growth, and because of disputes concerning the science behind it. The GOP supports free trade, including notably NAFTA and CAFTA.²

Historically, Republicans have had a strong belief in individualism, limited government, and business entrepreneurship.

¹ <http://www.gop.com/>

² Ibid.

The new party was created in 1854 as an act of defiance against what activists denounced as the Slave Power--the powerful class of slaveholders who were conspiring to control the federal government and to spread slavery nationwide. The party founders adopted the name "Republican" to indicate it was the carrier of "republican" beliefs about civic virtue, and opposition to aristocracy and corruption.

Besides opposition to slavery, the new party put forward a vision of modernization--emphasizing higher education, banking, railroads, industry and cities, while promising free home stead's to farmers.

Ronald Reagan produced a major realignment with his 1980 and 1984 landslides. In 1980 the Reagan coalition was possible because of Democratic losses in most social-economic groups. In 1984 Reagan won nearly 59% of the popular vote and carried 49 of the 50 states¹.

After his victory in the 2000 election, and because of the attacks on the United States, in September 11, 2001, George W. Bush's popularity rose as he pursued a "War on Terrorism" that included the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq.

¹ Ibid.

American Foreign Policy under the Republican Administration

Traditionally, a Republican foreign policy has been anchored by a commitment to a strong national defense. The world's problems will not be solved by the military alone, but force remains the first and last line of defense of U.S. freedom and security. When used judiciously, it is an essential instrument of U.S. power and foreign policy. Terrorists or states that attack the United States should expect a swift and violent response.

Republicans recognize that strength abroad begins with strength at home. U.S. resources require wise and judicious management. Moreover deficits and entitlement programs, if unchecked, will undermine confidence in the economy, impede economic growth and investment, make the United States less competitive, and erode the position as a world economic leader. Furthermore U.S. policymakers will then be forced to make hard choices between national security and domestic priorities.¹

The United States should refocus on the national interest and the pursuit of key priorities. These tasks are:²

1. To ensure that America's military can deter war, project power, and fight in defense of its interests if deterrence fails;
2. To promote economic growth and political openness by extending free trade and a stable international monetary system to all committed to these principles, including in the western hemisphere, which has too often been neglected as a vital area of U.S. national interest;

¹ Chuck Hagel , A Republican Foreign Policy. Foreign affairs, July/ August 2004. USA

² Condoleezza Rice, Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest. Foreign Affairs, January/February 2000. USA

3. To renew strong and intimate relationships with allies who share American values and can thus share the burden of promoting peace, prosperity, and freedom;
4. To focus U.S. energies on comprehensive relationships with the big powers, particularly Russia and China, that can and will mold the character of the international political system;
5. To deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers, this is increasingly taking the forms of the potential for terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Foreign policy in a Republican administration will most certainly be internationalist; the leading contenders in the party's presidential race have strong credentials in that regard. But it will also proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community. America can exercise power without arrogance and pursue its interests without hectoring and bluster. When it does so in concert with those who share its core values, the world becomes more prosperous, democratic, and peaceful. That has been America's special role in the past, and it should be again as we enter the next century.

The regime of Kim Jong Il is so opaque that it is difficult to know its motivations, other than that they are malign. But North Korea also lives outside of the international system. Like East Germany, North Korea is the evil twin of a successful regime¹ just across its border. It must fear its eventual demise from the sheer power and pull of South Korea. Pyongyang, too, has little to gain and everything to lose from engagement

¹ Ibid.

in the international economy. The development of WMD thus provides the destructive way out for Kim Jong Il.¹

President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea is attempting to find a peaceful resolution with the north through engagement. Any U.S. policy toward the north should depend heavily on coordination with Seoul and Tokyo. In that context, the 1994 framework agreement that attempted to bribe North Korea into forsaking nuclear weapons cannot easily be set aside. Still, there is a trap inherent in this approach: sooner or later Pyongyang will threaten to test a missile one too many times, and the United States will not respond with further benefits. Then what will Kim Jong IL do? The possibility for miscalculation is very high.²

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION

George W. Bush, son of former President George H.W. Bush, assumed the presidency in 2001. Recognizing his own inexperience in foreign and defense matters, he chose an experienced team to formulate and implement foreign and defense policy.

The National Security Council—made up of the President, Vice-President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice, CIA Director George Tenet, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Pentagon, and a few others—rather than the State Department seems to be dominant in foreign policy formulation. This has meant that foreign policy has often been set by the National Security Council before the State Department has had a chance to consult with allies and foreign countries.

¹ Ibid.

² John Feffer, Bush Policy Undermines Progress on Korean Peninsula

With this team, it is obvious that Bush's foreign policy is influenced by the right-wing think tank Project for the New American Century, and have a goal to promote "American global leadership". Many observers and scholars argued that Bush administration policies are hegemonic and excessively interventionist.

During his first eight months in the white house, George W. Bush ordered several changes to U.S. foreign and defense policies. As a Texan, bush placed a high priority on U.S. relations with Mexico and other Latin American states. His first trip outside the United States as president was to Mexico to discuss cooperation on immigration issues, anti-drug policies, economic development, and other U.S. - Mexican border issues. Bush also journeyed to the 2001 Summit of the Americas in Canada.¹

The Bush administration's "Forward Strategy for Freedom" for the greater Middle East, including the Middle East Partnership Initiative and increased funding for the National Endowment for Democracy, is a good start on an ambitious and pragmatic program for change in this region. Sustainable democracy will depend on institutions that support education, women's rights, and private-sector development. But it will also depend on progress toward the resolution of longstanding regional disputes such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.²

During his campaign, George W. Bush's foreign policy platform included support of a stronger economic and political relationship with Latin America, especially Mexico, and a reduction in involvement in "nation building" and other small-scale military engagements.

¹ Chuck Hagel, A Republican Foreign Policy

²Ibid .

Bush's decision to impose a tariff on imported steel, and to withdraw from global initiatives such as the Kyoto Protocol, the ABM Treaty, and an international land mine treaty, has been argued as evidence that he and his administration have a policy of acting unilaterally in international affairs.

On December 14, 2001, Bush scrapped the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a bedrock of U.S.-Soviet nuclear stability during the Cold War-era. Bush stated, "I have concluded the ABM treaty hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks."

This decision encountered wide skepticism in Europe and Asia, where it prompted fears of another costly arms race. The National Missile Defense project Bush supports is supposed to detect intercontinental ballistic missiles and to destroy them in flight. Critics doubt that the project could ever work and point out that it will cost US\$53 billion from 2004 to 2009, being the largest single line item in The Pentagon's balance.

The Bush presidency has also been marked by diplomatic tensions with the People's Republic of China and North Korea, the latter of which admitted in 2003 to having been in the process of building nuclear weapons and threatened to use them if provoked by the U.S. From the short time that the Bush administration has been in power, a trend of multilateralism can be seen in dealings with North Korea, the Bush Administration has, as it seems, gone out of their way to make it clear that they want to work with other player states such as Japan and South Korea, and maintain what the administration calls a "Unified front".¹

¹ Dao, James. "Bush Administration Halts Payments to Send Oil to North Korea." New York Times 14 November 2002. Online ed.

Another trend that can be seen early on in the Bush Administration's policy is that of economic punishment. Bush's plan to halt oil shipments, and to stop construction on the two light water reactors (both part of the Agreed Framework), will economically hurt the DPRK. North Korea depends on the oil shipments for its energy needs, and the building of the reactors gives jobs to many North Koreans. If the United States pulls funding for the reactor and simultaneously cuts off the oil shipments, it could be disastrous for North Korea.¹

During his first presidential visit to Europe in June 2001, Bush came under criticism from European leaders for his rejection of the Kyoto treaty, which is aimed at reducing carbon dioxide emissions that contribute to global warming. He has asserted, that the Kyoto Protocol is "unfair and ineffective" because it would exempt 80 percent of the world and "cause serious harm to the U.S. economy".²

Many governments have criticized the failure of the United States to ratify the Kyoto protocol, which was signed by the previous administration. Former President Clinton recommended that his successor (W. Bush) not submit the treaty for ratification until the wording was altered to reflect U.S. concerns. Bush who is opposed to the treaty, rescinded U.S. executive approval from the proposed treaty

BUSH ADMINISTRATION POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA

Since taking office the Bush administration has deliberately distanced itself from the Clinton administration's policy of engagement with North Korea. The Bush team has indicated that North Korea will have to jump through more difficult hoops on its missile program, verification, and even the placement of its conventional troops. Compliance

¹ Ibid.

² Michael E. O'Hanlon , A "Master Plan" to Deal With North Korea

will yield rewards, perhaps substantial ones such as the normalization of relations and a large aid package. According to some scholars, "The Bush bumper sticker would be: "Bigger carrot, bigger stick."¹

The Bush foreign policy team had expressed skepticism about the Clinton Administration's approach to North Korea during the presidential campaign and, upon assuming office, ordered a complete policy review. In March 2001, while the review was underway, ROK President Kim Daejung visited Washington with the intention of persuading the newly installed Bush Administration to continue the policy of the Clinton Administration and to win endorsement of his "Sunshine Policy" of engaging the North. Secretary of State Powell said after meeting President Kim that "in due course, when our review is finished, we'll determine at what pace and when we engage with the North Koreans"². For his part, President Bush said that while he had been forthright in supporting Kim's vision, he had also been forthright in expressing his "skepticism about whether or not we can verify an agreement in a country that doesn't enjoy the freedoms that our two countries understand"³: this was construed by the media as the President saying he would "not trust" North Korea.⁴

During the next few months, the Bush Administration's policy review considered completely withdrawing from the Agreed Framework, but concluded by coming down

¹ Karin Lee and John Feffer, *Bush Faces Challenges on the Korean Peninsula, foreign policy in focus*, 2003

² Remarks made by Secretary of State Colin Powell to the Pool Office of the Press Secretary, 7 March 2001, at <http://usinfo.org/>

³ White House transcript of Remarks made by President Bush and President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea, Office of the Press Secretary, 7 March 2001, at <http://usinfo.org/wf/2001/010307/epf302.htm>.

⁴ BBC News, "Bush rules out North Korea Talks", 8 March 2003, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1207864.stm>.

in favor of “improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea’s nuclear activities; verifiable constraints on North Korea’s missile programs and a ban on its missile exports; and a less threatening conventional military posture”¹

The foreign policy team that Bush has assembled clusters largely on the stick side of the carrot-stick spectrum. The Bush administration set the tone early when Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his Senate confirmation hearings, characterized Kim Jong II as a "dictator." Richard Armitage, the new deputy secretary of state, has proposed that a "Red Line" be drawn in the region to clarify what is unacceptable and acceptable behavior.²

President Bush has taken a very hard- line and also a rather disengaged approach to North Korea since the start of his administration. In the winter of 2001, he turned a cold shoulder to South Korean president Kim Dae Jung, known for his "sunshine policy" of engagement towards Pyongyang, when Kim visited Washington to request continued U.S. support for that policy.

The Bush administration mused publicly that North Korea should reduce its threatening conventional military forces prior to receiving any additional U.S. help or diplomatic attention, but never translated that sentiment into a concrete policy proposal. After September 11, President Bush lumped North Korea into an axis of evil with Iran and Iraq, even though North Korea posed different sorts of challenges (for example, it

¹ Statement by the President, 6 June 2001, at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-4.html>.

² Ibid.

now has few if any real links to terrorists) and even though recent history suggested it could be influenced through engagement.¹

Since the events of September 11, 2001, however, the Bush administration has neither launched their comprehensive approach, nor initiated serious high-level talks with North Korea. Moreover, Bush's 2002 State of the Union address hinted that his administration might adopt a harder line toward North Korea than before².

THE AXIS OF EVIL

On January 29, 2002, President George W. Bush announced what seemed a new U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula -and threw observers worldwide into confusion. In his state of the union address that night, Bush outlined the steps to come in his administration's "war on terrorism." Among them was a tough new approach to what he termed an "**axis of evil**".³ The states Bush originally gave in his speech were Iraq, Iran, North Korea and then later Syria, but the definition could be interpreted broadly to include other governments.

His words have been interpreted by some to mean that the "axis of evil" consists solely of those three countries. Some argue that this is a misinterpretation. However, singling out the three in such a forum as a State of the Union address, and the mention of three countries and no others as an "axis", in light of the historical analogy of the German-Italian-Japanese Axis, is likely to result in such an interpretation.

¹ Michael E. O'Hanlon , A "Master Plan" to Deal With North Korea .

² Jonathan D. Pollack, "The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework," *Naval War College Review* 56, no. 3 (2003): 11–12.

³ Victor D. Cha., *Korea's Place in the Axis*, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2002

The phrase is derived from that of the rogue state, but the term itself is reminiscent of the Axis powers of World War II and of President Reagan's evil empire designation of the Soviet Union.

President Bush's inclusion of North Korea in an "axis of evil" with Iran and Iraq is only the latest indication of Washington's new hard-line approach to Pyongyang¹

The speechwriter, who left government shortly after, has since claimed that North Korea was added to Iraq and Iran primarily to make sure that three countries were included in the axis, and to make sure that at least one of the countries was not Muslim. While this imagery played well in the US where people were still traumatized by 9/11, it had a number of deleterious consequences.

It linked administration policy on North Korea and Iraq—two countries that have, in fact, no alliance and little in common—in unnecessary ways that hampered the administration in the timing and content of its policies in both countries. It greatly increased North Korea's concerns about security vis-à-vis the US, undermining the main reason North Korea was adhering to the Agreed Framework, and came perilously close to violating Paragraph 3 of the Agreed Framework in which the U.S pledged not to make nuclear threats against North Korea. Some intelligence reports, in fact, hint that North Korean nuclear activities increased after this speech.²

¹ John Feffer Bush, Policy Undermines Progress on Korean Peninsula. March 2002, USA

² David S. Maxwell, Is the axis of Evil synchronizing its asymmetric offensive? December 20, 2002

Finally, it greatly angered the South Koreans, because South Koreans do not see North Korea as an entirely separate nation from South Korea. Rather North and South Korea tend to view each other as a single nation, with two different governments, rather than entirely different countries. Criticism of North Korea in some circumstances is taken as criticism of the entire Korean nation, and can lead to resentment. A second reason South Koreans were angered is that the axis of evil speech suddenly and without warning undermined President Kim Dae Jung's reconciliation policy with North Korea that the Bush administration had told South Korea they supported. Many South Koreans, in fact, had interpreted George Bush's treatment of Kim Dae Jung during his White House visit as condescending and insulting, and the axis of evil speech just added fuel to this fire.¹

Following the axis of evil speech, hints of a more aggressive Bush policy toward North Korea emerged. In March, 2002 the Nuclear Posture Review, a classified document, was reported by The Los Angeles Times to advocate preemptive nuclear strikes against even non-nuclear states. It was said this policy would be incorporated into the National Security Strategy report due to be published in the fall. China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Russia, and Syria were specifically mentioned as possible candidates in the Los Angeles Times report²

Preemptive action on rogue states is a prominent feature of the review, and the only countries mentioned by name in this section of the report are Iraq and North Korea.³

¹ Ibid.

² Paul Richter, "US Works Up Plan for Using Nuclear Arms," *Los Angeles Times* March 9, 2002.

³ National Security Review of the United States of America. PP. 14-15.

The National Security Strategy focused on eliminating terrorism and weapons of mass destruction using a “crime and punishment” framework that emphasizes the use of negative sanctions and military force, and barely mentions positive sanctions at all. It advocates unilateral action and use of preemption, for “while the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.”¹

In spite of these new threats of the United States to North Korea, at this time North Korea was still trying to open negotiations with the United States and Japan. They expressed the hope that the Agreed Framework would be continued. Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō, visiting P’yŏngyang , came to an agreement on establishment of foreign relations that involved the admission of DPRK kidnapping of 11 Japanese nationals, and Japanese promises of \$8-10 billion in aid. Kim Jong Il took this occasion to ask Prime Minister Koizumi to convey to the United States the DPRK’s voluntary indefinite moratorium on missile testing and their willingness to negotiate with the United States on this issue. North Korea successfully and peacefully participated later in the Asian Games held in South Korea

The Bush administration’s policy of “hostile neglect” toward Pyongyang has been a fundamental source of many crises. Although, North Korea’s uranium-based program began well before Bush took office, but this administration takes responsibility for

¹ Ibid p 6

inciting acceleration of Korea's nuclear program and for fostering the fragile conditions under which the program's revelation quickly precipitated a complete breakdown of U.S.-North Korea relations.

Bush officials probably assumed that the aggressive policy to disarm Iraq would also bolster confrontational intimidation of North Korea by implicitly signaling that, as a charter member of the "axis of evil," it could become subject to the same type of pressure.

But Kim Jong Il seems to have noticed a key point that the Bush team apparently overlooked: as long as the U.S. is preparing for a major war in the Middle East, U.S. threats to resort to the same kind of coercion of North Korea I are far less credible.¹

THE ARMITAGE REPORT

Richard Lee Armitage was, from 2001 to 2005, the 13th United States deputy secretary of state, the second-in-command at the state department. Previously, he was a high-ranking troubleshooter and negotiator in the departments of state and defense. Ambassador Richard L. Armitage was President of Armitage Associates and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He chaired a working group on U.S. Policy toward North Korea, which built up a Comprehensive Package² to be able to form a new policy toward North Korea.

The Armitage report which was called "A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea" recommended that deterrence or containment be implemented as a second path when

¹ Wade L. Huntley, Coping with North Korea, FPIF Policy Report February 2003 <http://www.fpif.org/index.html>).

² Richard L. Armitage, A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea .National Defense University, Strategic Forum, Number 159, March 1999.

diplomacy failed. The Bush administration considers diplomacy a good way to test North Korea's true intention, whether or not diplomacy holds any real possibility of yielding positive results¹.

The Bush administration wants to test Pyongyang's intentions using diplomacy. The Armitage report explained that the objective of diplomacy should be to offer Pyongyang clear choices regarding its future, such as economic benefits, security assurances, political legitimization, or the certainty of enhanced military deterrence. In fact, the idea of diplomacy as it is discussed in the Armitage report is not so different from that of the Clinton administration as it was described in the Perry report.²

The Armitage report also made clear that the United States should honor existing commitments. The report clearly said that the Agreed Framework successfully froze North Korea's plutonium production at the Yongbyon and Taechon facilities and that North Korea was prevented from obtaining fissile material from the fuel rods of the reactor, which might have been used to produce five to six nuclear weapons. Colin Powell confirmed that the Bush administration was "continuing to live within the constraints of the Agreed Framework"³ and saw "no reason to change their position right now."⁴

¹ Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the President," news release, June 6, 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/.20010611-4.html>.

² William J. Perry, "Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations," department of state: office of the North Korea policy coordination, October 12, 1999.

³ U.S. Department of State, "Briefing on Trip to East Asia," July 21, 2001, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/4347.htm>.

⁴ U.S. Department of State, "Remarks with Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Han," June 7, 2001, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/3374>.

In his report, Richard Lee Armitage suggested that United States objectives should be maintaining and as necessary strengthening deterrence, and eliminating through peaceful means the military threat posed by North Korean nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons and missiles. The goal was to reduce the risks to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.

Washington should table an offer that meets Pyongyang's legitimate economic, security, and political concerns. This would allow the United States to seize the diplomatic initiative as well as the moral and political high ground. It would also strengthen the ability to build and sustain a coalition if North Korea does not cooperate. Most importantly, the failure of enhanced diplomacy should be demonstrably attributable to Pyongyang.

The objective of negotiations should be to offer Pyongyang clear choices in regard to its future: on the one hand, economic benefits, security assurances, political legitimization, on the other, the certainty of enhanced military deterrence. For the United States and its allies, the package as a whole means that we are prepared-if Pyongyang meets our concerns-to accept North Korea as a legitimate actor, up to and including full normalization of relation.

Many scholars discussed the nature of Bush administration's foreign policy, they argued that the hawkish policy dominated in U.S. foreign policy.

Hawk engagement provides a way to convince allies that non-coercive strategies have already been tried - and failed. As the Armitage report explains, "the failure of enhanced diplomacy should be demonstrably attributable to Pyongyang."

Hawk engagement would also let the United States turn today's carrots into effective sticks for tomorrow. Merely continuing to impose the more than 50-year-old embargo on North Korea, for example, is unlikely to lead to a change in its behavior. Were Washington to lift sanctions, however - letting the North get a taste for what it could gain by cooperating - then a threat to reinstate the sanctions would likely have a much more dramatic effect.¹

Engagement and aid, on the other hand, convey a more compassionate image of Americans and South Koreans. As Bush stated at this February's summit in Seoul, although Washington despises Kim Jong Il's despotic regime, it has "great sympathy and empathy for the North Korean people. We want them to have food. And at the same time, we want them to have freedom." The presence of sacks of food scattered around North Korea imprinted with "United States," "Republic of Korea," and "Government of Japan" would reinforce that message. Although coercion has traditionally been more attractive to hawks, since it seems the fastest route to the North's capitulation, engagement will better prepare for the hawks' desired objective: the reunification of the Korean Peninsula.²

The United States and the DPRK had intermittent diplomatic contacts between June 2001 and October 2002, but no substantive meetings. In October 2002 Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and the Pacific, James Kelly, visited Pyongyang to explain the Bush Administration's policy. At this meeting, Kelly stated that the United States had obtained information that, starting in the late 1990s, the DPRK covertly acquired uranium enrichment technology for nuclear weapons. The DPRK, in a Ministry of

¹ Cha, Victor D , KOREA'S PLACE IN THE AXIS . Foreign Affairs, May/Jun2002, Vol. 81, Issue 3

² Ibid.

Foreign Affairs statement issued after the meeting, did not deny having this secret program, but justified its actions as a response to hostile Bush Administration policies.

The two sides met again in Beijing in mid-April, although U.S. officials described the meeting as talks and not negotiations. At this meeting, the DPRK reportedly claimed that it already possessed two bombs and was reprocessing additional spent fuel, that it would provide a “physical demonstration” of its nuclear capabilities (a reference to a possible nuclear weapons test) and that it would export nuclear weapons.¹ The DPRK also proposed a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue that included reviving elements of the Agreed Framework and other U.S. concessions before the dismantlement of the North’s nuclear program. The United States repeated its demand that the DPRK first dismantle its nuclear weapons program before it would discuss other measures.

In May 2003 President Bush demanded the “complete, irreversible and verifiable” dismantlement of the North’s nuclear weapons program before the United States would entertain Pyongyang’s concerns; no specific U.S. steps were mentioned.²

¹ David E. Sanger, “North Korea Says It Now Possesses Nuclear Arsenal,” New York Times, 25 April 2003.

² Press Availability with President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi, Crawford, Texas, 23 May 2003, at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/print/20030523-4.html>.

FINDINGS

COMPARISON BETWEEN CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION

Since its creation after the Korean War in 1950, North Korea has caused many problems for the United States. North Korea has, for instance, broken treaties and even gone so far to threaten the use of nuclear weapons. Naturally, different presidents have dealt with North Korea in different ways. Eisenhower for example, threatened the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea in 1953 many presidents ignored North Korea all together, and some tried to ignore the country, but circumstances did not allow it. Two such presidents, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, the 42nd and 43rd presidents respectively also tried at the beginning of their tenure as president to ignore the brewing problems with North Korea.

Their circumstances for being drawn into the affairs of North Korea were remarkably different (Clinton getting drawn in because of the threat of nuclear capabilities and Bush getting drawn in because of terrorism) as were their approaches to North Korea. Many similarities can be seen, however, between how Clinton started dealing with North Korea and how Bush started out dealing with North Korea.

The Bush administration appears to consider North Korea as a reckless and aggressive expansionist state with which the United States will be unable to negotiate and achieve a satisfactory result. As a result, the Bush administration believes that the

United States should adopt a hawkish policy and should punish North Korea's rogue behavior. In contrast, the Clinton administration did not seem to view North Korea as an irrational revisionist state, despite its rogue behavior, but felt that North Korea could be understood through the security dilemma.

The Bush administration's comprehensive approach has treated the Agreed Framework as the beginning of a policy toward North Korea, not as the end of the problem. With regard to such criticisms, Clinton administration officials also admit that the United States needs to address some limitations of the Agreed Framework.

The Perry report recognized that the Agreed Framework neither verifiably froze all of North Korea's nuclear weapons-related activities, nor covered ballistic missiles. Thus, the Perry report recommended that the United States seek a total and verifiable end to all nuclear weapons-related activities and address the long-range missile programs. Because Yongbyon remains North Korea's quickest and surest path to nuclear weapons, however, the Perry report argued that the United States is required to supplement the Agreed Framework but not to undermine or supplant it.

Likewise, there is little difference of opinion between the two reports regarding the importance of the Agreed Framework, and they did not propose substantially different policy recommendations for the framework. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations have agreed on the importance of continuing and supplementing the framework, although both the United States and North Korea abandoned it in fall 2002.

Bush administration emerging strategy of hawk engagement can best be understood by juxtaposing it with the standard rationale for engagement with the North, exemplified by Kim Dae Jung's sunshine policy. Kim's strategy rests on the idea that North Korea's threatening posture arises from insecurity. Abandoned by its Cold War

patrons, economically bankrupt, politically isolated, and starving, North Korea sees the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as its only path to security and survival. Engagement can reduce this insecurity and end the proliferation threat. Various carrots - economic aid, normalized relations, and reduced security tensions - are supposed to give Kim Jong Il a stake in the status quo and persuade him that he can best serve his own interests by giving up on the pursuit of dangerous new weapons.

Hawk engagement breaks with this logic in several respects. It acknowledges that diplomacy can be helpful, but sees the real value of engagement as a way to expose the North's true, malevolent intentions -- thought to include not just the desire to develop nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, but ultimately to expel U.S. forces from the peninsula, overthrow the regime in Seoul, and reunify Korea under communist rule. Hawk engagement aims to thwart these goals by dealing with Pyongyang in the near term but also laying the groundwork for punitive actions against it later on.

Both administrations attempted to undergo a policy of isolationism when it came to the DPRK but, both were forced to engage the country at some point. They both then made a few decisions to give the appearance of action, and then found some way to brush the problem aside. They each found different ways to push the problem aside though, Clinton used the cover of negotiations and agreements, where Bush used the prospect of war against Iraq to direct attention away from the ongoing problem in North Korea. The point is, nonetheless that both administrations underwent a similar process with North Korea early in their presidency.

For several reasons, W. Bush had a better position than had Clinton to wield engagement as a both a carrot and a powerful stick. Ironically, this flexibility is largely due to the success of Clinton's engagement and South Korea's sunshine policy. These

measures provided Pyongyang with new benefits (such as food, energy, and hard currency) that Bush can now implicitly threaten to withdraw.

By contrast, when Clinton started making overtures to the North in 1994, there were no antecedents (in terms of tangible benefits) on which he could build or existing perks he could threaten to cut. The policy that Republicans once so vehemently criticized, in other words, has now enabled their hawkish version of engagement.

The final difference between hawk engagement and more traditional alternatives is that the hawkish model offers more than mere short-term policy prescriptions. Rather, it presumes a distinct view of how developments in Korea could best suit American interests, both toward reunification and beyond. It is crucial, hawks believe, to promote stronger relations between the two main U.S. Asian allies, Japan and South Korea, and to consolidate the trilateral Washington-Tokyo-Seoul relationship.

PREDICTIONS OF WHAT WILL BE THE FUTURE OF THE U.S-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS

It is important to keep in mind though that Bush is still in his presidency, and as such he is still making new policy decisions, and other decisions he has made are still playing out. We will not know the full effect of his presidency on North Korea until well after he is out of the White House. Until then, we will have to keep on making intelligent guesses and predictions as to where his policy will bring us in the future.

1. First of all, the main motivation of the North Korean leadership is security and survival of their regime, so North Korea will not attack the United States with weapons of mass destruction, or with terrorism, and under present circumstances

would not invade South Korea, either. Koreans know that a full-scale war, will lead to the destruction of their regime, they will avoid launching a major attack that would give the United States a pretext for bombing, or invading, unless they are convinced that the United States is about to destroy them by military or economic means.

2. The security threat to North Korea comes primarily from the United States, so the North Koreans have proved willing to give up nuclear weapons if they can achieve security from US attack by other means. They will ask for compensation for giving up what they consider their sovereign right to have a nuclear program.
3. The economic difficulties that North Korea has faced over that past 10 years, and their loss of economic and military support from the Soviet Union, have led to great degradation of their military capacity at a time when South Korea—with the assistance of the United States—has greatly improved the training, equipment, and sophistication of its armed forces. A full-scale invasion of South Korea, is now very difficult for North Korea.

On the other side, the next assumptions of what will United States do in medium or long term can be as following:

1. Waiting that the regime will not survive long enough to seriously threaten U.S. or allied interests with its nuclear capability.
2. Find a "Comprehensive Settlement" of Korean peninsula issues, primarily through diplomacy. The Bush administration clearly wants to wait until the end

of the Iraq war to deal with the North Korea issue, the longer waiting for effective diplomacy to begin, the more difficult the problem becomes to solve.

3. Using Economic Sanctions under the United Nations Security Council

An effective sanctions regime would quickly bring North Korea's industries and perhaps the whole economy to a virtual standstill, and even just the denial of remittances from Japan would provide considerable leverage.

Although Japan could be expected to support sanctions, however reluctantly, but China's support cannot be assumed. Even if China were to abstain on a sanctions vote, its participation would be necessary to make the sanctions effective.

4. Military Augmentation.

This scenario could be considered if diplomacy fails to bring North Korea substantially back into compliance with its NPT obligations or at least contain its nuclear capability at the current level. This option likely would be considered in tandem with an effort to secure international economic sanctions, or as an alternative should the United States fail to gain support for sanctions.

5. Counter Proliferation Strikes Against North Korea's Nuclear Installations.

Though counter proliferation missions are described as limited military missions in terms of objectives, duration, and forces involved the targeted country would presumably consider the attacks an act of war. The tactical success of counter proliferation mission could be lost in the consequences of another war on the Korean peninsula. Hence, in the North Korean case, such a mission would probably have to be

considered not as an isolated military operation, but rather as part of a larger regional military strategic plan.

A counter proliferation mission in North Korea would also raise constitutional and international legal questions. First, what basis would the U.S. President use to order such attacks, apart from his powers as Commander-in-Chief? Would defense of U.S. forces stationed in Korea be sufficient? What form of congressional approval or consultation would be required in advance for a military action that could result in a larger-scale conflict? Second, it is not clear what basis in international law exists for counter proliferation missions. They are not included as enforcement measures in the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, or any other arms proliferation agreement.

6. Negotiated Reduction of the U.S. Military Presence in South Korea:

The option would be based on a U.S. view that there were no other practical options to deal with North Korea's nuclear weapons program besides substantially meeting North Korea's bottom-line demand as the price of giving up its nuclear weapons program. Under this option, the United States would make a new effort to gain North Korean compliance with full IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities in return for concessions regarding the American military presence.

CONCLUSION

North Korea does not work with Iran and Iraq to develop weapons of mass destruction or sponsor terrorist groups. Although North Korea has sold missile technology to Iran, it has not engaged in terrorism in the past sixteen years. Furthermore, North Korea has not launched a war in more than fifty years, since the Korean War. Thus, North Korea is not the type of country that President Bush identified in his address, and U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea should not be influenced by the anti terror strategy that developed after the events of September 11. Even politicians known the most hawkish neoconservatives, said that the North Korean issue is very different from that of Iraq and that a slower and more long-term approach is needed

In the Korean peninsula North Korea has developed its nuclear program because of its serious security concern. Although the United States insisted that North Korea should first dismantle its nuclear weapons program, North Korea refuses to disarm without U.S. security guarantees because North Korea does face a security dilemma. The Bush administration has denounced North Korea, It broke off negotiations as soon as it came into office, and George W. Bush declared the North Korea part of the "axis of evil." A few months later Bush called the Korean leader a "pygmy," saying: "I loathe Kim Jong Il I've got a visceral reaction to this guy...They tell me, well we may not need to move too fast, because the financial burdens on people will be so immense if this guy was to topple -- I just don't buy that." after all these argument what must be the Korean position towards USA? Peace, diplomacy, or more provocations against this administration and its allies in the Korean peninsula.

It's sure that under Bush doctrine of pre-emption, the U.S. can attack countries it thinks might support terrorism, whether or not they have actually done so. And who decides whether we attack? Here's what Mr. Bush says: "You said we're headed to war in Iraq. I don't know why you say that. I'm the person who gets to decide, not you." L'état, c'est moi.

The Bush and Clinton administrations have neither seen two different North Koreas, nor have they pursued two different policy goals. U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea depends on what specific situation each administration faces and how they understand and deal with the North Korean security dilemma.

In short, when we read carefully the two administrations' North Korean strategies, it is clear that their perception gap does not lead directly to their policy disagreement.

So, the hypothesis didn't prove true, because the researcher discover after a deep reading of the two policies (Clinton administration and G.W. Bush administration) that many players have an immense impact on U.S. Foreign Policy, such as congress, president public opinion, international hemisphere, but events and facts in the world can effect the U.S. foreign policy especially towards North Korea.

Furthermore, this study prove that the republican party who dominate the foreign policy for a long time (because from 1980 to 1992, the republicans were in the power), prove that they like to be a world policeman and have a hand in all international issues even if these issues don't pose a problem for the U.S. security .

The bloom disappeared U.S. Russian relations during the Clinton years as Russian arms sales to Iran, ballistic missile defense, NATO expansion, and fighting in the Balkans showed divergent U.S. and Russian interests.

The Bosnian civil war and the 1999 Kosovo conflict saw U.S. forces deployed to Europe in fighting for the first time since World War II. These conflicts were part of a larger issue, namely when should the United States intervene overseas? In addition to Bosnia and Kosovo, the United States under Clinton sent military forces to Haiti, Liberia, the Taiwan straits, and elsewhere. In several cases where fighting erupted and tensions escalated, the United States did not deploy forces: Zaire, Rwanda, and Korea. In the middle east, Clinton nurtured the Arab Israeli peace process, but with little success. Clinton also focused on international economics, finalizing NAFTA, the Asian-pacific economic cooperation pact, the free trade area of the Americas, and the world trade organization. Stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction and countering terrorism were also key issues, as were the drug trade, the environment, and immigration.

The U.S. mission has in fact changed over time. Thomas Jefferson in the eighteenth century believed that the U.S mission was to be a “sanctuary” for those who sought to flee “the misrule of Europe” how different Jefferson’s view was compared to Harry Truman’s twentieth-century proclamation that “the free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms” or George W. Bush’s twenty –first-century view that the United States had to “defend not only the precious freedoms but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear”. To Harry Truman and George W. Bush, the United States was a sanctuary no more, but an activist

defender of freedom around the world. Similarly, as we have seen, some U.S. national interests have changed over time, with Americans foreign policy interests

After September 11, a war on terrorism soon became the chief U.S. Foreign Policy priority, which began with the United States overthrowing Afghanistan's Taliban government. The war on terrorism also included security measures at home, intelligence sharing with allies, cooperative diplomacy with many countries eliminating terrorist access to banks, and preemptive U.S. military action.

As the United States increasingly pursued the war on terrorism on its own, critics charged the United States was acting unilaterally. There was a considerable body of evidence: U.S. relations with Russia and the Middle East, U.S. opposition to the international criminal court, U.S. hostility toward international environmental agreements, and U.S. trade and aid policies, and U.S. actions toward Iraq.

In the, 2002 the United States warned it would act unilaterally against Iraq if UN inspections for weapons of mass destruction did not occur. When inspectors reported Iraq did not fully cooperate, the United States in 2003 launched the Iraq war. U.S. forces rolled into Baghdad but found no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq so the United States emphasized overthrowing Saddam, democratizing Iraq, and rebuilding Iraq as its war aims.

By 2004, the United States had an activist foreign policy, declaring it would continue to act before its enemies could. This was a new version of mission necessitated George w. Bush maintained, by the terrorist threat. Realism, involvement, and unilateralism

were the order of the day. Others disagreed with these policy choices, arguing that the United States had become an imperial power.

During more than two centuries of existence, the United States has risen from a small weak and inconsequential player on the margins of world affairs. today, the united states it's the worlds only superpower, with the worlds largest economy, most powerful military forces, and most influential social and cultural outlooks.

Isolationism and unilateralism are different matters. As American power grew and the world changed following World War II, the United States abandoned isolationism as a key principle of foreign policy. Not all Americans agreed with this, and some even today call for a return to this principle upon which American foreign policy was initiated in the eighteenth century. Realistically, however there is little chance of this occurring. As for unilateralism, it was substantially overshadowed following World War II by a new U.S. multilateralism manifested in American willingness to join a military alliance for the first time during peace and to participate extensively in a host of multilateral international organizations such as the U.N, the World Bank, and the international monetary fund.

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APPENDIX I

MAP OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Korean Peninsula



APPENDIX II

LIST OF PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES

➤ DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Election year	Result	Nominees	
		President	Vice President
<u>1828</u>	won	<u>Andrew Jackson</u>	<u>John Caldwell Calhoun</u> ^[1]
<u>1832</u>	won		<u>Martin Van Buren</u>
<u>1836</u>	won	<u>Martin Van Buren</u>	<u>Richard Mentor Johnson</u>
<u>1840</u>	lost		
<u>1844</u>	won	<u>James Knox Polk</u>	<u>George Mifflin Dallas</u>
<u>1848</u>	lost	<u>Lewis Cass</u>	<u>William Orlando Butler</u>
<u>1852</u>	won	<u>Franklin Pierce</u>	<u>William Rufus de Vane King</u> ^[2]
<u>1856</u>	won	<u>James Buchanan</u>	<u>John Cabell Breckinridge</u>
<u>1860</u>	lost	<u>Stephen Arnold Douglas</u> (Northern)	<u>Herschel Vespasian Johnson</u>
	lost	<u>John Cabell Breckinridge</u> (Southern)	<u>Joseph Lane</u>
<u>1864</u>	lost	<u>George Brinton McClellan</u>	<u>George Hunt Pendleton</u>
<u>1868</u>	lost	<u>Horatio Seymour</u>	<u>Francis Preston Blair, Jr.</u>
<u>1872</u>	lost	<u>Horace Greeley</u> ^[3]	<u>Benjamin Gratz Brown</u>
<u>1876</u>	lost	<u>Samuel Jones Tilden</u>	<u>Thomas Andrews Hendricks</u>
<u>1880</u>	lost	<u>Winfield Scott Hancock</u>	<u>William Hayden English</u>
<u>1884</u>	won	<u>Stephen Grover Cleveland</u>	<u>Thomas Andrews Hendricks</u> ^[2]
<u>1888</u>	lost		<u>Allen Granberry Thurman</u>
<u>1892</u>	won		<u>Adlai Ewing Stevenson</u>
<u>1896</u>	lost	<u>William Jennings Bryan</u>	<u>Arthur Sewall</u>
<u>1900</u>	lost		<u>Adlai Ewing Stevenson</u>
<u>1904</u>	lost	<u>Alton Brooks Parker</u>	<u>Henry Gassaway Davis</u>
<u>1908</u>	lost	<u>William Jennings Bryan</u>	<u>John Worth Kern</u>
<u>1912</u>	won	<u>Thomas Woodrow Wilson</u>	<u>Thomas Riley Marshall</u>
<u>1916</u>	won		
<u>1920</u>	Lost	<u>James Middleton Cox</u>	<u>Franklin Delano Roosevelt</u>
<u>1924</u>	Lost	<u>John William Davis</u>	<u>Charles Wayland Bryan</u>

<u>1928</u>	Lost	<u>Alfred Emmanuel Smith</u>	<u>Joseph Taylor Robinson</u>
<u>1932</u>	Won	<u>Franklin Delano Roosevelt</u> ^[2]	<u>John Nance Garner</u>
<u>1936</u>	Won		<u>Henry Agard Wallace</u>
<u>1940</u>	Won		<u>Harry S. Truman</u>
<u>1944</u>	Won		<u>Alben William Barkley</u>
<u>1948</u>	Won	<u>Harry S. Truman</u>	<u>John Jackson Sparkman</u>
<u>1952</u>	Lost	<u>Adlai Ewing Stevenson II</u>	<u>Estes Kefauver</u>
<u>1956</u>	Lost		<u>Lyndon Baines Johnson</u>
<u>1960</u>	Won	<u>John Fitzgerald Kennedy</u> ^[2]	<u>Hubert Horatio Humphrey</u>
<u>1964</u>	Won	<u>Lyndon Baines Johnson</u>	<u>Edmund Sixtus Muskie</u>
<u>1968</u>	Lost	<u>Hubert Horatio Humphrey</u>	<u>Robert Sargent Shriver</u> ^[4]
<u>1972</u>	Lost	<u>George Stanley McGovern</u>	<u>Walter Frederick Mondale</u>
<u>1976</u>	Won	<u>James Earl Carter, Jr.</u>	<u>Geraldine Anne Ferraro</u>
<u>1980</u>	Lost		<u>Lloyd Millard Bentsen Jr.</u>
<u>1984</u>	Lost	<u>Walter Frederick Mondale</u>	<u>Albert Arnold Gore, Jr.</u>
<u>1988</u>	Lost	<u>Michael Stanley Dukakis</u>	<u>Joseph Isadore Lieberman</u>
<u>1992</u>	Won	<u>William Jefferson Clinton</u>	<u>John Reid Edwards</u>
<u>1996</u>	Won		
<u>2000</u>	Lost	<u>Albert Arnold Gore, Jr.</u>	
<u>2004</u>	Lost	<u>John Forbes Kerry</u>	

^[1] Resigned.

^[2] Died in office.

^[3] The Greeley/Brown ticket was nominated by the Liberal Republican Party and endorsed by the Democrats. Greeley died shortly after the election.

^[4] Thomas Eagleton was the original vice presidential nominee, but was forced to withdraw his nomination.

➤ **REPUBLICAN PARTY**

Election year	Result	Nominees and office-holders		President	
		President	Vice President	#	Term
<u>1856</u>	Lost	<u>John Charles Frémont</u>	<u>William Lewis Dayton</u>		
<u>1860</u>	Won	<u>Abraham Lincoln</u> ^[1]	<u>Hannibal Hamlin</u>	16th	<u>1861–1865</u>
<u>1864</u>	Won		<u>Andrew Johnson</u> ^[2]		
<u>1868</u>	Won	<u>Ulysses Simpson Grant</u>	<u>Schuyler Colfax</u>	18th	<u>1869–1877</u>
<u>1872</u>	Won		<u>Henry Wilson</u> ^[3]		
<u>1876</u>	Won	<u>Rutherford Birchard Hayes</u>	<u>William Almon Wheeler</u>	19th	<u>1877–1881</u>
<u>1880</u>	Won	<u>James Abram Garfield</u> ^[1]	<u>Chester Alan Arthur</u>	20th	<u>1881</u>
		<u>Chester Alan Arthur</u>	<i>None</i>	21st	<u>1881–1885</u>
<u>1884</u>	Lost	<u>James Gillespie Blaine</u>	<u>John Alexander Logan</u>		
<u>1888</u>	Won	<u>Benjamin Harrison</u>	<u>Levi Parsons Morton</u>	23rd	<u>1889–1893</u>
<u>1892</u>	Lost		<u>Whitelaw Reid</u>		
<u>1896</u>	Won	<u>William McKinley</u> ^[1]	<u>Garret Augustus Hobart</u> ^[3]	25th	<u>1897–1901</u>
<u>1900</u>	Won		<u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>		
			<i>None</i>		
<u>1904</u>	Won	<u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>	<u>Charles Warren Fairbanks</u>	26th	<u>1901–1909</u>
<u>1908</u>	Won	<u>William Howard Taft</u>	<u>James Schoolcraft Sherman</u> ^[3]	27th	<u>1909–1913</u>
<u>1912</u>	Lost		<u>Nicholas Murray Butler</u>		
<u>1916</u>	Lost	<u>Charles Evans Hughes</u>	<u>Charles Warren Fairbanks</u>		
<u>1920</u>	Won	<u>Warren Gamaliel Harding</u> ^[4]	<u>John Calvin Coolidge</u>	29th	<u>1921–1923</u>
			<i>None</i>		
<u>1924</u>	Won	<u>John Calvin Coolidge</u>	<u>Charles Gates Dawes</u>	30th	<u>1923–1929</u>
<u>1928</u>	Won	<u>Herbert Clark Hoover</u>	<u>Charles Curtis</u>	31st	<u>1929–1933</u>
<u>1932</u>	Lost				
<u>1936</u>	Lost	<u>Alfred Mossman Landon</u>	<u>William Franklin Knox</u>		
<u>1940</u>	Lost	<u>Wendell Lewis Willkie</u>	<u>Charles Linza McNary</u>		
<u>1944</u>	Lost	<u>Thomas Edmund Dewey</u>	<u>John William Bricker</u>		
<u>1948</u>	Lost		<u>Earl Warren</u>		
<u>1952</u>	Won	<u>Dwight David Eisenhower</u>	<u>Richard Milhous Nixon</u>	34th	<u>1953–1961</u>
<u>1956</u>	Won				
<u>1960</u>	Lost	<u>Richard Milhous Nixon</u>	<u>Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.</u>		

<u>1964</u>	Lost	<u>Barry Morris Goldwater</u>	<u>William Edward Miller</u>		
<u>1968</u>	Won	<u>Richard Milhous Nixon</u> ^[5]	<u>Spiro Theodore Agnew</u> ^[5]	37th	<u>1969–1974</u>
<u>1972</u>	Won	<u>Gerald Rudolph Ford, Jr.</u>	<u>Nelson A. Rockefeller</u>	38th	<u>1974–1977</u>
<u>1976</u>	Lost	<u>Ronald Wilson Reagan</u>	<u>George Herbert Walker Bush</u>		
<u>1980</u>	Won	<u>George Herbert Walker Bush</u>	<u>James Danforth Quayle</u>	40th	<u>1981–1989</u>
<u>1984</u>	Won	<u>Robert Joseph Dole</u>	<u>Jack French Kemp</u>	41st	<u>1989–1993</u>
<u>1988</u>	Won	<u>George Walker Bush</u>	<u>Richard Bruce Cheney</u>		
<u>1992</u>	Lost	<u>George Walker Bush</u>	<u>Richard Bruce Cheney</u>	43rd	<u>2001–present</u>
<u>1996</u>	Lost	<u>Robert Joseph Dole</u>	<u>Jack French Kemp</u>		
<u>2000</u>	Won	<u>George Walker Bush</u>	<u>Richard Bruce Cheney</u>	43rd	<u>2001–present</u>
<u>2004</u>	Won	<u>George Walker Bush</u>	<u>Richard Bruce Cheney</u>		
<u>2008</u>					

^[1] Assassinated.

^[2] Lincoln was succeeded by Democrat Andrew Johnson who ran on a Union ticket with him in 1864.

^[3] Died while in office and was not replaced.

^[4] Died of natural causes.

^[5] Resigned.

APPENDIX III**TEXT OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK****AGREED FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

Geneva, October 21, 1994

Delegations of the Governments of the United States of America (U.S.) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 21, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in the August 12, 1994 Agreed Statement between the U.S. and the DPRK and upholding the principles of the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the U.S. and the DPRK to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The U.S. and the DPRK decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue:

I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.

1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S. will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW(e) by a target date of 2003.

-- The U.S. will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the DPRK. The U.S., representing the international consortium, will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project.

-- The U.S., representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of this Document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as soon as possible after the date of this Document.

-- As necessary, the U.S. and the DPRK will conclude a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S., representing the consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy foregone due to the freeze of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit.

-- Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and electricity production.

-- Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date of the Document and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in accordance with an agreed schedule of deliveries.

3) Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of LWR's and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities.

-- The freeze on the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this Document. During this one month period, and throughout the freeze, the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose.

-- Dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be completed when the LWR project is completed.

-- The U.S. and the DPRK will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the spent fuel from the 5 MW(e) experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK.

4) As soon as possible after the date of this document U.S. and DPRK experts will hold two sets of experts' talks.

-- At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative energy and the replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor program with the LWR project.

-- At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific arrangements for spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition.

II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

1) Within three months of the date of this Document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.

2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other's capital following resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert level discussions.

3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the U.S. and the DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the Ambassadorial level.

III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

- 1) The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.
- 2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
- 3) The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.

IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

- 1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.
- 2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK's safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract, inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will continue at the facilities not subject to the freeze.
- 3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying

the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.

Robert L. Gallucci

Head of Delegation of

the United States of America,

Ambassador at Large

United States of America

Kang Sok Ju

Head of the Delegation of

the Democratic People's

of the Republic of Korea,

First Vice-Minister of

Foreign Affairs of the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

APPENDIX IV**A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea****By Richard L. Armitage 1****National Defense University, Strategic Forum, Number 159, March 1999**

Since the Agreed Framework (AF) was signed by the United States and North Korea on October 21, 1994, the security situation on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia has changed qualitatively for the worse.

The discovery last year of a suspect North Korean nuclear site and the August 31 launch of a Taepo Dong missile have combined to raise fundamental questions about Pyongyang's intentions, its commitment to the agreement, and the possibility of North-South reconciliation. These developments also raise profound questions about the sustainability of current U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula.

The Agreed Framework successfully addressed a specific security problem--North Korea's plutonium production at the Yongbyon and Taechon facilities. Under the agreement, operations were frozen at the two facilities and Pyongyang was prevented from obtaining fissile material from the fuel rods of the reactor core for five to six nuclear weapons.

Had the program continued unabated, North Korea might have been able to produce enough fissile material for a substantial nuclear arsenal. Arguably, the Agreed Framework was a necessary but not sufficient response to the multiple security challenges posed by North Korea. Indeed, the development of the Taepo Dong missile

poses an expanding security threat to Northeast Asia and, increasingly, to the Middle East, Europe, and even the United States itself.

Changing Assumptions

Experience in dealing with Pyongyang since the Agreed Framework was signed challenges several critical assumptions on which public and Congressional support for U.S. policy has been based.

The first is the assumption made by some senior administration officials that the Agreed Framework had ended North Korea's nuclear program.

The second is that North Korea is a failed state on the verge of collapse and that a "hard landing"--collapse perhaps accompanied by aggression--should be avoided.

The third is that the Agreed Framework would induce **North Korea** to open up to the outside world, initiate a gradual process of North-South reconciliation, and lead to real reform and a "soft landing."

These assumptions suggested that, even if little progress was made on other political/security issues, the Agreed Framework was an effective, time-buying strategy. At a minimum, North Korea's conventional capabilities would continue to degrade (as they have). Optimally, the **North** would solve our problems by ultimately reconciling or uniting with the South. These assumptions are now open to question.

Reality Check

The disclosure of at least one suspect site--on which construction began prior to the agreement--reinforces the possibility that Pyongyang has frozen only a portion of its nuclear program or is seeking to develop a covert nuclear weapons program.

The Agreed Framework was structured to become stronger over time in constraining the North's nuclear weapons capability. This meant deferring the requirement for the North Korean nuclear program to come into full compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full-scope safeguards until roughly 2002-03. In effect, the agreement accepted the possibility that North Korea might have one or two nuclear devices. Since 1994, it is also possible that Pyongyang could have acquired additional nuclear weapons technology and/or fissile material from external sources.

Moreover, the core assumption of imminent collapse is seriously flawed. Despite severe hardships, there are no signs of regime-threatening social or political unrest, or military disaffection. As underscored in its 50th anniversary celebration last year, the North Korean regime appears to have consolidated itself under Kim Jong Il.

There are also no signs that the regime is contemplating any radical market-oriented reforms. Instead, forced by necessity, it is experimenting at the margins with modest reform to alleviate food shortages at the local level and gain hard currency. With Chinese aid and a variety of hard currency schemes--missile exports, counterfeiting, narcotics trafficking, selling overflight rights--the regime has been able to keep urban areas minimally functioning. By all appearances, the regime may be able to stagger on indefinitely.

Starvation has not politically weakened the regime. As demonstrated in the cases of Ukraine under Stalin and China under Mao, there is not necessarily a connection between human misery and the stability of the regime in a totalitarian system. The regime has been willing to destroy an entire generation to preserve its power.

At the same time, Pyongyang has spurned the political overtures of the most conciliatory president in the history of the Republic of Korea, Kim Dae Jung. President Kim has written volumes on Korean unification, including plans for reunification that are similar to those offered by the late Kim Il Sung. The unwillingness to deal seriously with Kim Dae Jung suggests a fundamental fear that North-South reconciliation would undermine the legitimacy of the regime in Pyongyang.

President Kim's Sunshine Policy (now known as the Engagement Policy) has established a formula for reconciliation on the peninsula, while deferring the ultimate goal of reunification as a practical matter. To date, Pyongyang has responded to Seoul's economic, social, and cultural nongovernmental overtures, but has rejected any political reconciliation with South Korea. Moreover, as evidenced by recent incidents of military infiltration, it continues its aggressive behavior.

Who Is Buying Time?

The notion that buying time works in our favor is increasingly dubious. A growing body of evidence suggests that it is North Korea that is buying time--to consolidate the regime, continue its nuclear weapons program, and build and sell two new generations of missiles, while disregarding the well-being of its 22 million people. Kim Jung Il's assumption of the post of Chairman of North Korea's Military Commission has raised the influence of the armed forces. These developments have created an increasingly dangerous security environment in Northeast Asia.

Indeed, North Korea's nuclear weapons program and the development of missile delivery systems have combined to pose an enhanced threat to the security of Japan. This threat has grown even as Japan has continued to support the Agreed Framework and its light-water reactor project. Yet we cannot expect Tokyo's continued support for approaches to Pyongyang that fail to address Japan's security concerns.

North Korea's provocative actions and belligerent posture have challenged--and taken advantage of--our interest in stability. For Pyongyang, the lesson of the past four years is that brinkmanship works.

Foundation for a New Approach

A Congressionally mandated review has made it clear that current policy toward North Korea is politically unsustainable. Similar political pressures are today evident in Japan and may soon surface in the Republic of Korea. The appointment of former Secretary of Defense William Perry to conduct a review of policy toward North Korea is an important step in fashioning a policy that is politically viable and protects the vital interests of the United States and its allies.

A new approach must treat the Agreed Framework as the beginning of a policy toward North Korea, not as the end of the problem. It should clearly formulate answers to two key questions: first, what precisely do we want from North Korea, and what price are we prepared to pay for it? Second, are we prepared to take a different course if, after exhausting all reasonable diplomatic efforts, we conclude that no worthwhile accord is possible?

Current policy is fragmented. Each component of policy--implementing the Agreed Framework, four-party peace talks, missile talks, food aid, POW-MIA talks--operates

largely on its own track without any larger strategy or focus on how the separate pieces fit together. In the absence of a comprehensive policy, North Korea has held the initiative, with Washington responding as Pyongyang acts as demandeur.

A successful approach to North Korea must be comprehensive and integrated, and must address the totality of the security threat. The stakes involved should make Korea a matter of the highest priority for the President. This will require sustained attention to manage the issue with Congress, our Korean and Japanese allies, and China.

The diplomacy leading to the Agreed Framework had such focus when Robert Galucci was named special coordinator, reporting directly to the Secretary of State and the President. Unfortunately, after Ambassador Galucci left his Korea post in 1995, no successor was named.

The logic of the policies pursued by the United States, its allies, and China has been one of muddling through. This has allowed North Korea to obtain economic benefits while maintaining its military threat. Given the opacity of North Korea's totalitarian regime, its decision-making process is unknowable.

Only by fairly testing Pyongyang's intentions through diplomacy can we validate policy assumptions. If a diplomatic solution is not possible, it is to our advantage to discover this sooner rather than later in order to best protect our security interests. If North Korea leaves no choice but confrontation, it should be on our terms, not its own.

One cannot expect North Korea to take U.S. diplomacy seriously unless we demonstrate unambiguously that the United States is prepared to bolster its deterrent military posture. This can be done without appearing to threaten Pyongyang.

At the same time, policy should provide an adequate incentive structure to any forces inside the North Korean elite who may be inclined to believe that the least bad choice for survival is one of civil international behavior and opening. To convince the North to modify its posture, we need a larger conceptual framework, with greater incentives and corresponding disincentives.

The first step toward a new approach is to regain the diplomatic initiative. U.S. policy toward North Korea has become largely reactive and predictable, with U.S. diplomacy characterized by a cycle of North Korean provocation (or demand) and American response. The intention is to be proactive and to define the agenda.

This begins with setting new terms of reference. Diplomacy must fashion an initiative that integrates the entire spectrum of security challenges, while enhanced deterrence must address what we are prepared to do, should diplomacy prove inadequate.

Our strategy must be closely coordinated with our allies. It must integrate Tokyo's interests and assets, as well as Seoul's Engagement Policy and defense capabilities. Such integration, at a minimum, would strengthen the U.S. alliance structure, while positioning Washington to deal more effectively with Pyongyang.

A new approach to North Korea will necessarily test China's intentions. Beijing was helpful in the process leading to the Agreed Framework, and the United States publicly cites that cooperation as a major payoff of its China policy.

But China is also pursuing its own agenda. Beijing is sustaining North Korea with aid, despite Pyongyang's apparent unwillingness to heed its advice. China has resisted active cooperation--with the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, with the World Food Program, and on missiles.

Its independent actions pose a challenge to any successful U.S. policy. No approach to North Korea is likely to succeed absent some modicum of active cooperation from--and clear understanding with--China. Beijing must understand that it will either bear a burden for failure or benefit from cooperation.

Operational Elements of A New Comprehensive Approach

We would propose a new comprehensive approach for management of the problems posed by North Korea. The package should combine the elements of deterrence and diplomacy cited below. This package is not offered with any unwarranted optimism regarding what is possible vis-a-vis North Korea. Thus, the strengthening of deterrence is central to this package.

To make a comprehensive approach sustainable politically, it is critical to start with and maintains close coordination with Congress. To be successful, policy toward the Korean peninsular requires a foundation of strong bipartisan support. A regular mechanism for executive-legislative interaction should be developed. The former Senate Arms Control Observer Groups on U.S.-Soviet relations can serve as a model.

To protect U.S. and allied interests, a strengthening of deterrence must support diplomacy. Deterrence depends essentially on the proper blend of diplomacy, declaratory policy, and demonstrable military capability. As a result, if diplomacy fails, North Korea should be faced with the consequences of its choice: isolation or containment in an environment in which U.S. leadership and alliance structures have been reinvigorated and strengthened, allowing the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan to act together.

The following steps are critical to bolstering credible deterrence.

The United States should encourage Japanese leaders to accelerate the timetable for Guidelines Legislation, and to underscore the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance to Tokyo's security interests in the region and beyond.

The United States should call for a trilateral (the United States, Republic of Korea, and Japan) defense ministers consultative meeting to address a range of peninsula contingencies. In particular, this meeting should consider actions to implement force enhancement options, which might include agreements to increase counter-battery radar around Seoul and deploy more Patriot batteries to Japan from Europe and the continental United States. Public statements should also focus on deepening missile defense cooperation, as well as a spectrum of military exercises to deal with a variety of North Korean actions.

"Red Lines" should be drawn. The United States, together with the Republic of Korea and Japan, should clarify what is unacceptable behavior and underscore that provocative military action by North Korea will not be tolerated and will provoke a response.

The Pentagon should undertake a review of the American presence in South Korea, not with a view to reduction, but to ensure that U.S. forces can optimally deal with the evolving nature of the North Korean threat.

As a separate but related action, the Pentagon and the commander in chief of Combined Forces Command in the Republic of Korea should conduct a review to determine what mix of surveillance, radar, and other weapons is required to improve the defense of Seoul against bombardment or surprise attack. To underscore alliance commitments, the United States should also announce that it is prepared to augment forces in theater.

To enhance the prospects for the comprehensive package and to advance U.S. and allied interests, diplomacy must be closely coordinated with Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing.

The U.S. point person should be designated by the President in consultation with Congressional leaders and should report directly to the President. This step also aims to move the issue to the highest possible level of decision-making in North Korea.

Diplomacy should seek to align South Korean and Japanese policies to influence positively North Korean behavior as well as to reinforce military deterrence.

The United States should propose a trilateral (United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan) foreign minister-level consultative meeting. The goals should be to name high-level point persons, establish coordinating mechanisms, and raise the issue to the level of a presidential national security priority. Trilateral coordination should reach understandings on a division of responsibilities for the comprehensive proposal.

China's active cooperation is vital. Because the United States and China share common interests with respect to the Korean peninsula, we expect China to act in a positive manner. Active cooperation will enhance Sino-American relations. However, if conflict occurs as a result of inadequate cooperation, Beijing will bear a heavy responsibility. Moreover, the burden of keeping North Korea on "life support" will fall squarely on China if our diplomatic initiative fails.

The Comprehensive Package

United States objectives should be maintaining and as necessary strengthening deterrence, and eliminating through peaceful means the military threat posed by North Korean nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons and missiles. Our goal is to reduce the risks to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. To the extent the threat cannot be eliminated, the goal is to contain the residual threat. In addition, the United States seeks to facilitate South-North reconciliation.

Washington should table an offer that meets Pyongyang's legitimate economic, security, and political concerns. This would allow the United States to seize the diplomatic initiative as well as the moral and political high ground. It would also strengthen the ability to build and sustain a coalition if North Korea does not cooperate. Most importantly, the failure of enhanced diplomacy should be demonstrably attributable to Pyongyang.

The objective of negotiations should be to offer Pyongyang clear choices in regard to its future: on the one hand, economic benefits, security assurances, political legitimization, on the other, the certainty of enhanced military deterrence. For the United States and its allies, the package as a whole means that we are prepared--if Pyongyang meets our concerns--to accept North Korea as a legitimate actor, up to and including full normalization of relations.

Negotiations would address the following:

1. The Agreed Framework: We should make clear our intention to honor existing commitments, but also underscore that the political and security environments have deteriorated significantly since October 1994 because of North Korea's actions. To

sustain support for the agreement, it is imperative that the issues regarding the suspect site(s) and missiles be addressed.

Sites: We should note that suspect sites are covered in the "confidential minute" to the Agreed Framework. Our objective is to have a credible mechanism to increase on-going transparency of the present site--but not be limited to that site. The United States should make it clear in a unilateral statement that the comprehensive package encompasses any suspect site in North Korea.

Plutonium: To bring North Korea promptly into compliance with IAEA safeguards, we need to prepare for IAEA inspections under the agreement. North Korean cooperation in preserving the historical record of its past nuclear activities is critical. In addition, a new bargain should include early removal from North Korea of the nuclear spent fuel currently in storage at Yongbyon.

Quid pro quo: Accelerating the process of resolving site questions, and the issue of IAEA compliance, could likely require a U.S. commitment to expedite the construction of the two light-water reactors, and negotiation of a United States-North Korean nuclear cooperation agreement.

2. Missiles: North Korean missiles have become a far more prominent problem than was the case when the Agreed Framework was signed. It implicitly puts the missile problem on the agenda. Our near-term objectives are to end testing and exports, and, over the long term, to obtain North Korean adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime limits.

However, if missile exports continue and the United States can identify them, we should do what we can to intercept those shipments. We will make it clear that we will act under the UN Charter's right of self-defense.

3. Conventional threat: The United States should table a proposal for confidence building measures to begin a process aimed at reciprocal conventional force reductions. Any new peace mechanism should be linked to the reduction of the conventional threat.

4. Food/economic assistance/sanctions: The United States should continue to provide some humanitarian food and medical aid with the caveat of increased transparency on distribution. But, our emphasis would be on assisting North Korean economic restructuring. We would support actions that open its economy to market forces.

We are prepared to further ease sanctions and support its membership in the international financial institutions, recognizing that this requires change on the part of Pyongyang. If the North takes the necessary steps, the United States, with its allies, should consider establishing a Korean reconstruction fund within the World Bank or Asian Development Bank.

U.S. diplomacy must integrate Seoul's Engagement Policy (e.g., government approval of investment projects, particularly large industrial investment by major firms known as Chaebol) with the broad policy objectives of the comprehensive package.

As a step-by-step roadmap to a more cooperative relationship, economic benefits beyond humanitarian aid should be phased in as North Korea implements threat reduction measures. In the context of an economic assistance package, the United States could consult with North Korea to review the energy component of the Agreed Framework to develop alternate energy sources.

5. Security assurances: The United States, along with the Republic of Korea and Japan, should propose a six-party (the United States, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea) meeting to deal with the security of North Korea.

A multilateral commitment should be based on the pledges made in Kim Dae Jung's inaugural address--that we have no intent to implode North Korea, to absorb North Korea, or to force North Korea to change its political system. Assurances could run the gamut from a pledge of nonaggression to a commitment to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of North Korea. Our goal should be to foster an environment making it as easy as possible for Pyongyang to choose reform.

The United States and its allies should make it clear that we are prepared to coexist with a less threatening regime in the North.

6. Normalization: If North Korea satisfies our security concerns, the United States should be prepared to move toward full normalization of relations.

Should Diplomacy Fail

The one enduring element of this initiative--irrespective of North Korea's response--is the reinforcing of U.S. leadership in maintaining stability and enhancing security in this critical region. The U.S. effort to strengthen security cooperation with our key allies--the Republic of Korea and Japan--is an integral part of this leadership and becomes even more central to regional security.

The virtue of this initiative is that it will test North Korea's intentions, discover whether diplomacy holds any real possibility of yielding positive results, and, in the process, restore U.S. leadership. This would enable us to bolster a coalition to deter and contain

North Korea. It is aimed at leaving Pyongyang significantly worse off than if it had chosen a future of cooperation on mutually beneficial terms.

Should diplomacy fail, the United States would have to consider two alternative courses, neither of which is attractive. One is to live with and deter a nuclear North Korea armed with delivery systems, with all its implications for the region. The other is preemption, with the attendant uncertainties.

Strengthened deterrence and containment. This would involve a more ready and robust posture, including a willingness to interdict North Korean missile exports on the high seas. Our posture in the wake of a failure of diplomacy would position the United States and its allies to enforce "red lines."

Preemption. We recognize the dangers and difficulties associated with this option. To be considered, any such initiative must be based on precise knowledge of facilities, assessment of probable success, and clear understanding with our allies of the risks.

We are under no illusions about the prospects for success of the comprehensive package outlined above. The issues are serious and the implications of a failure of diplomacy are profound.

(1) Ambassador Richard L. Armitage is President of Armitage Associates and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

He chaired a working group on U.S. Policy Toward North Korea whose members included: Johannes A. Binnendijk, Institute for National Strategic Studies; Peter T.R. Brookes, House Committee on International Relations; Carl W. Ford, Ford and

Associates; Kent M. Harrington, Harrington Group L.L.C.; Frank S. Jannuzi, Minority Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Robert A. Manning, Council on Foreign Relations; RADM Michael A. McDevitt, USN (Ret.), Center for Naval Analyses; James J. Przystup, Institute for National Strategic Studies; GEN Robert W. RisCassi, USA (Ret.), L-3 Communications Corporation; and Ambassador Paul D. Wolfowitz, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University.

APPENDIX V

Nuclear North Korea & six Party Multilateral Negotiations

Korea has indicated its willingness to go to the fifth round of the six-party multilateral nuclear talks in Beijing in November 2005 as it had promised. However, the green signal came with a accusation that the United States has been using words and deeds contrary to the joint statement issued in September this year. The United States and North Korea have since disagreed over when to discuss giving the Stalinist Regime a light-water civilian nuclear reactor while Washington administration reiterated that discussions about a reactor deal should only come after inspectors verify Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program.

Historically speaking, North Korea is the United States' longest-standing adversary. After the division of Korean Peninsula at the end of World War II, the two countries have always found themselves at the loggerheads.

Relations between the two countries was at the lowest ebb in the early 1990s when North Korea expanded its nuclear program and the US considered bombing North's suspected weapons development facilities.

The nuclear standoff between US and North Korea has many repercussions than one to the world. The severity of this imbroglio has put the whole world in tenterhooks and certainly looks ominous when the US has already brandished North Korea as a part of the

'Axis of Evils' along with Iran and pre-invasion Iraq. All eyes are now set for a positive outcome to come from the ongoing six-party talks involving the US, China, Japan,

South Korea, North Korea and Japan. So far four rounds of talks have been taken place. New round of this multilateral parley on nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula is expected to open before mid-November where participants would discuss issues that include the dismantling of North Korea's nuclear weapons program, economic aid and normalization of diplomatic relations, and the construction of new light-water reactors in North Korea.

A chronology of events along with the latest Joint Statement is presented here:

July 20, 1977: North Korea signed “Type 66” agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The agreement allowed the IAEA to monitor the Soviet supplied 2MW IRT-research reactor and 0.1MW critical assembly located at Yongbyon.

December 12, 1985: North Korea signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Under the provisions of the NPT, North Korea had 18 months to negotiate and sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

May 1988: The IAEA conducted inspections of the Soviet-supplied 2MW IRT-research reactor at Yongbyon.

December 1988: The deadline for North Korea to negotiate and sign the IAEA safeguards agreement passed without the agreement being signed.

July 1989: US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney asked North Korea to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

September 1989: US Secretary of State James A. Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze met to discuss suspicions concerning North Korea's nuclear weapons program. During the meeting, Baker expressed concern about North Korea's research reactor.

February 1990: North Korea's representative to the IAEA placed North Korea's conditions for signing the IAEA safeguards agreement. The conditions included:

(a) All US nuclear weapons be removed from South Korea, (b) the US-South Korean Team Spirit military exercises be discontinued, and (c) North Korea be allowed to declare the safeguards agreement "null and void, depending on its evaluation of the attitudes" of nuclear weapon states.

April 18, 1990: According to Deputy Director General of the IAEA, Boris Semenov, North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement by September 1990.

July 21, 1990: North Korea proposed direct talks with the United States as a condition for agreeing to IAEA on-site inspections. It also said that it would sign the IAEA's safeguards agreement if the United States:

- (1) promises not to launch a nuclear attack against it, and
- (2) withdraws nuclear weapons from South Korea.

November 24, 1990: Following the US-IAEA-North Korean meeting in China, US Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon received a report which stated that North Korea may sign the IAEA safeguards agreement in order to improve relations with the United States and Japan.

April 12, 1991: South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-Ku announced that South Korea will attack North Korea's nuclear facilities at Yongbyon if it does not sign the

IAEA safeguards agreement. North Korean President Kim Il-Sung said that the announcement, a “virtual declaration of war.”

June 07, 1991: A delegation of senior North Korean diplomats, led by Chon Chung-kuk met with IAEA Director General Hans Blix in Vienna. North Korea said it will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement and allow international inspections to all of its facilities, (including installations at Yongbyon). Officials from both sides were scheduled to meet in July 1991, and the agreement should be ready for approval by

September 1991. According to one IAEA representative, North Korea will sign an inspection agreement as soon as technical matters, such as inspections scheduling and procedures were negotiated. North Korea continued to demand that the United States remove its nuclear weapons and troops from South Korea before it will consider international inspections.

December 23, 1991: North Korea announced that it will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement.

December 31, 1991: Both North and South Korea signed Joint Declaration on denuclearization of Korean Peninsula. Through this declaration both the sides pledged not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons and forbade the possession of nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. A procedure for inter- Korean inspection was to be organized and a North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) was mandated with verification of the denuclearization of the peninsula.

January 21, 1992: US-North Korean high-level political meetings commenced at the US Mission to the United Nations in New York. In the meeting North Korea was urged to permit IAEA inspections and to give up its nuclear weapons option. North Korea responded by agreeing to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement.

January 30, 1992: North Korea signed the IAEA safeguards agreement. Its deputy minister for the atomic energy industry Hong Gun-pyo said that his country will abide by the agreement. However, North Korea did not ratify nor implement the agreement. North

Korea's director of the foreign ministry Chang Munson said that the process of ratification by the legislature could take as long as six months.

March 18, 1992: The United States informed North Korea that it will impose sanctions if North Korea does not allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities. The United States and South Korea believed that North Korea was stalling inspections in order to move its nuclear facilities underground.

April 09, 1992: The North Korean parliament ratified the IAEA safeguards agreement. According to IAEA regulations, North Korea required to allow international inspections of its facilities within 90 days. It also required to list all of its nuclear facilities within 30

days of the last day of the month after it ratifies the safeguards agreement. William Dirks, IAEA Deputy Director General, said that the IAEA will go to the UN Security Council if North Korea failed to list all of its nuclear facilities for inspection.

January 26- February 06 1993: The IAEA team conducted its sixth inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities. The purpose of the inspection was to clarify inconsistencies found in plutonium samples that were taken at an earlier date. One of the inconsistencies identified was that between "the composition and quantity of plutonium [North Korea] declared to the IAEA" (obtained from melting fuel rods) and the IAEA's test results. The second discrepancy was between the isotopic composition of plutonium extracted by the radiochemical laboratory and liquid waste samples. Prior to the inspection, North Korea said that the latter inconsistency occurred when "the

solution from the basic experiment of plutonium extraction in 1975 was put together in the waste tank of the radiochemical laboratory.”

February 08, 1993: North Korea publicly stated that it might take “countermeasures of self-defense” if the United States and other countries press for inspections of certain facilities.

February 21, 1993: North Korean Minister of Atomic Energy Choe Hak-kun informed IAEA Director General Hans Blix that North Korea will not allow special inspections of the two sites suspected of storing nuclear waste.

March 12, 1993: North Korea announced to withdraw from the NPT. It cited the treaty’s escape clause on defending supreme national interests. North Korea’s two reasons for withdrawing are: (a) the Team Spirit “nuclear war rehearsal” military exercises, and (b) the IAEA demand for special inspection of two suspect sites.

March 25, 1993: North Korea ignored the deadline for IAEA inspections of two of its undeclared sites. According to North Korea, the sites are military facilities, which are unrelated to its nuclear program. The IAEA said that it will refer the matter to the UN Security Council.

November 01, 1993: The UN General Assembly passed a nine-point resolution urging North Korea to “cooperate immediately with the IAEA in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement.” The resolution was passed with 140 in favor, North Korea voting against, and nine abstentions.

November 30, 1993: North Korea’s foreign ministry suggested that North Korea will withdraw from the NPT if the United States does not agree to third round of negotiations on the nuclear issue.

June 03, 1994: The IAEA Director General Hans Blix informed the UN Security Council that the Agency was unable to verify whether North Korea has used the

plutonium extracted from its 5MW gas-graphite reactor to make nuclear weapons. According to Blix, North Korea has removed the 300 fuel rods of the “core fuel element” and mixed them up without marking their exact location in the reactor, thus making it impossible to determine the past activities of the reactor.

June 13, 1994: North Korea submitted a letter officially relinquishing its IAEA membership.

October 21, 1994: The United States and North Korea signed an accord (Agreed Framework), which specified the actions that both countries will take to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Under the terms of the agreement, a US-led international consortium will help North Korea replace its graphite-moderated reactors with two 1,000MW light-water reactors. The international consortium will compensate North Korea for the freeze on its graphite-moderated reactors by supplying 500,000 tons of heavy-fuel oil annually until the new reactors come online. Second, the United States and North Korea will make efforts to normalize their economic and political relations by reducing investment and trade barriers. Third, both countries will strive towards establishing a nuclear-weapons-free-zone on the Korean Peninsula. Finally, North Korea will help strengthen the nonproliferation regime by remaining a member of the NPT. It will also allow the IAEA to implement the safeguards agreement and monitor the freeze on its nuclear facilities.

November 04, 1994: The UN Security Council endorsed the nuclear accord reached between North Korea and the United States in October 1994. It approves North Korea’s voluntary decision to freeze its current nuclear program and comply with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. North Korea rejects the statement on the ground that it only emphasizes North Korea’s responsibilities under the framework agreement.

October 13, 1995: IAEA Director General Hans Blix said in a report to the UN Security Council that North Korea has denied the IAEA inspectors permission to evaluate the plutonium levels in the nuclear spent fuel. Blix added that North Korea has only provided the IAEA with minimal access to its Yongbyon nuclear facilities.

January 23, 1996: An IAEA delegation arrived in Pyongyang to continue talks on North Korea's suspended nuclear operations. Talks concluded on 29 January 1996 and North Korea agreed that the IAEA can conduct routine and *ad hoc* inspections of its operational nuclear sites.

March 18, 1996: IAEA Director General Hans Blix informed the IAEA Board of Governors that North Korea was not cooperating with IAEA efforts to ascertain the quantity of plutonium held at the Yongbyon nuclear facility. IAEA inspectors have made a number of attempts to photograph the facility since September 1995, in accordance with agreements reached with North Korea. However, they have been restricted from taking photographs. North Korea has also been slow in granting visas for IAEA inspectors.

September 17, 1996: North Korea's representative to the UN agencies in Vienna states that North Korea "will not give the IAEA any information whatsoever" about spent fuel from its 5MW gas-graphite reactor "until the new reactors are finished and begin operating."

March 17, 1998: North Korea refused to cooperate with IAEA inspectors, citing delays in the implementation of the 1994 US-North Korean Agreed Framework. IAEA inspectors are prevented from taking samples of nuclear waste. Inspectors are also barred from taking samples from the high-temperature water plant of the 5MW gas-graphite reactor.

September 1998: North Korea launched a test missile over Japan, claiming it was simply a scientific satellite.

This launch alarmed Japan—and much of the rest of the world—about North Korea's intentions regarding reentry into the nuclear arms race.

October 16, 2002: Washington said on 16 October 2002 that North Korea had admitted to secretly developing uranium enrichment technology for nuclear weapons, in violation of the 1994 agreement with the US.

December 21, 2002: North Korea defied world opinion on 21 December 2002 by removing United Nations seals and cameras at a nuclear power plant suspected of making weapons-grade plutonium. North Korea tampered with surveillance devices the UN nuclear watchdog installed at the Yongbyong complex. The agency said the North cut most of the seals on equipment and tampered with cameras at the five megawatt reactors. North Korea said the agency did not respond to Pyongyang's requests that it remove the equipment. The International Atomic Energy Agency said it was trying to keep communications open with Pyongyang. IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei said it was deplorable North Korea had ignored requests for talks.

January 10, 2003: On January 10, 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

January 23, 2003: North Korea and South Korea agreed to find a peaceful solution to nuclear crisis.

January 27, 2003: Former U.S. President Bill Clinton urged the George W Bush government to sign a nonaggression pact with North Korea, at the World Economic Forum in Davos. He argued that poverty was driving it to sell missiles and bombs, being its cash crop. The United States should “give them a nonaggression pact if they want

that, because we'd never attack them unless they did something that violated that pact anyway.”

February 26, 2003: Officials from the United States stated that North Korea had reactivated a reactor at its main nuclear complex.

March 02, 2003: In a continuing show of force, armed North Korean fighter aircraft intercepted and allegedly targeted a United States reconnaissance aircraft over International Waters in the Sea of Japan (East Sea of Korea). That was the first such interception since April 1969 when a North Korean jet shot down a United States Navy surveillance airplane, killing all 31 crewmen aboard.

March 06, 2003: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld revealed that the United States is considering completely withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea.

April 24, 2003: The United States, People's Republic of China, and North Korea met in Beijing for trilateral discussions about North Korea's nuclear weapons program. No resolution was reached, and tensions remained high. The United States has raised the specter of sanctions against North Korea due to Pyongyang's 'brinkmanship'. In the past, North Korea has said that international sanctions would constitute a “declaration of war.”

April 27, 2003: South Korea sent a delegation to Pyongyang pushing the North to end its nuclear weapons program.

May 12, 2003: North Korea declared the 1992 accord with South Korea nullified, citing U.S. hostility as a threat to its sovereignty. S. Korea responded on May 14 that since the U.S. has continued to proceed with its promise to build two nuclear reactors in the North, the accord is still effective. The South's announcement came as its president Roh Moo-hyun met with George W. Bush in Washington DC to discuss a common approach to North's pursuit of nuclear weapons.

August 06, 2003: North Korea and Iran planned to form an alliance to develop long-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Under the plan, North Korea will transport missile parts to Iran for assembly at a plant near Tehran, Iran.

August 27, 2003: The first round of Six-party talks begins at Beijing involving the US, China, Japan, Russia, North and South Korea. The participants in the six-party talks agreed to solve the nuclear problem peacefully through dialogue, to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and to pave the way for permanent peace. All the parties agreed to seek a fair and realistic resolution in a manner that is phased and synchronized or parallel in implementation. The participants agreed not to take actions that could escalate the situation in the process of resolving the issue peacefully. They also agreed to build mutual confidence, narrow the differences in opinions, and expand their common views through dialogue. The participants finally agreed to continue the process of the six-party talks and to decide as soon as possible through diplomatic routes the place and time of the next meeting.

August 28, 2003: North Korea announced that it is in possession of nuclear weapons, has the means to deliver them, and will soon be carrying out a nuclear test to demonstrate this capability.

February 25, 2004: The Second Round of Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing from 25th to 28th of February, 2004. Through the talks, while differences remained, the Parties enhanced their understanding of each other's positions.

April 09, 2004: North Korea said standoff with US at "brink of nuclear war".

June 23, 2004: The Third Round of the Six-Party Talks on North Korean nuclear issues was held from June 23 to June 26 at Diaoyutai Guest House in Beijing, China. At the meeting, both the DPRK and the United States (US) presented proposals that incorporated measures that were to be taken by the six parties as first steps towards

resolution of the nuclear issue, after which each country in the talks, including Japan, presented concrete suggestions and recommendations. The six party found common ground in their understandings and proposals in the sense that focus is given to first steps towards unclear dismantlement.

However, there were some differences in position between the DPRK and other parties concerning the scope of preliminary measures (whether or not to include uranium enrichment) and verification procedures; and (ii) while the DPRK aims for an agreement on freezing of its nuclear programs and compensatory measures, Japan, the US and the

Republic of Korea (ROK) seek an agreement on a framework towards “dismantlement” of nuclear programs. The six parties will persistently continue their work through the working group and at the next round of the Six-Party Talks scheduled to be held by the end of September.

September 28, 2004: North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su-hon told the UN General Assembly that “hostile policy” of the United States was responsible for the nuclear standoff. At a news conference after his address, Choe said his country had converted 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods into weapons. South Korean officials have estimated that this quantity of rods is sufficient to create up to eight nuclear weapons.

February 10, 2005: North Korea announced on February 10, 2005 that it had developed nuclear weapons for its self-defense. At the same time North Korean officials suspended participation in multi-nation talks to discuss its arms program.

July 26, 2005: The Fourth Round of Six-Party talks opened in Fangfeiyan, Diaoyutai State Guesthouse at 9 am on July 26, 2005. The delegations from all the six countries attended the meeting. By August 7, the talks reached a deadlock and a recess was called.

September 13, 2005: Talks resume, but a new North Korean request to be built a light water reactor prompts warnings of a "standoff" between the parties.

September 19, 2005: North Korea has agreed to give up all nuclear activities and rejoin the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. In return, the US said it had no intention of attacking the North, and promised aid and electricity. The agreement came during the second lag of the fourth round of six-nation talks in Beijing, aimed at ending a three-year standoff over North Korea's nuclear ambitions. However, North Korea says it has right to "peaceful uses of nuclear energy and demanded light water reactor to be discussed at "appropriate time".

September 20, 2005: North Korea indicated that it would not scrap its nuclear program or return to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) unless it was given light-water nuclear reactors. "The United States should not even dream of the issue of the DPRK's dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing light-water nuclear reactors, a physical guarantee for confidence-building," the Foreign Ministry said in a statement, casting doubt on the agreement in Beijing.

JOINT STATEMENTS

Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing, September 19, 2005

Following is a text of the joint statement at the conclusion of the fourth round of Six-Party Talks, as released in Beijing on September 19, 2005 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China.

Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing September 19, 2005 The Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing, China among the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America from July 26th to August 7th, and from September 13th to 19th, 2005.

Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Song Min-soon, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the ROK; Mr. Alexandr Alekseyev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the United States attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations. Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.

For the cause of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia at large, the Six Parties held, in the spirit of mutual respect and equality, serious and practical talks concerning the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on the basis of the common understanding of the previous three rounds of talks, and agreed, in this context, to the following:

1. The Six Parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.

The DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.

The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.

The ROK reaffirmed its commitment not to receive or deploy nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while affirming that there exist no nuclear weapons within its territory.

The 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be observed and implemented.

The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of light water reactor to the DPRK.

2. The Six Parties undertook, in their relations, to abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognized norms of international relations.

The DPRK and the United States undertook to respect each other's sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies. The DPRK and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.

3. The Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally. China, Japan, ROK, Russia and the US stated their willingness to provide energy assistance to the DPRK.

The ROK reaffirmed its proposal of July 12th 2005 concerning the provision of 2 million kilowatts of electric power to the DPRK.

4. The Six Parties committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum. The Six Parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation Northeast Asia.

5. The Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the afore-mentioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of "commitment for commitment, action for action".

6. The Six Parties agreed to hold the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing in early November 2005 at a date to be determined through consultations.

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